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True love must single-hearted be-
Chorus: Exactly so!
From every selfish fancy free-
Chorus: Exactly so!
It follows then, a maiden who,
Devotes herself to loving you
Is prompted by no selfish view
Chorus: Exactly so!1
Introduction
The songs tell us that when two people are in love, their souls
unite; their two hearts beat as one. The tax code also tells us that their
two tax liabilities can be as one, united in a joint tax return-but only
if they are not simply in love, but are also married. While tax theorists
have debated the appropriateness of the joint return, they have not
examined the premise behind the joint return: that married people-
and only married people-share not only their hopes and dreams, but
also their money.
t Cf WILLIAM VAN ZANDT & JA_ MILMoRa, LoVE, SEx AND THE IRS (1980).
* Professor of Law, Tuilane School of Law. My thanks to Professors Michael
Asimow, Lloyd Bonfield, Lynne Henderson, Edward J. McCaffery, James Wilson, and the
faculty at the University of Puget Sound Law School for their careful readings of prior
drafts and helpful comments. Additionally, I am greatly indebted to Margaret Seboldt for
her skilled analysis of the data from my survey, and the staff at Cleveland-Marshall College
of Law for processing the data. I would also like to thank Dean John Kramer of Tulane
Law School for a research grant that helped support the completion of this Article. Last,
but not least, my thanks to all those who took the time to fill out my questionnaire.
1. WILLIAM SCHWENCK GILBERT & ARTHUR SULLIVAN, PATIENCE, act 1, finale
(Belwin Mills ed., 1975) (1881) (Patience singing). Judge Nichols quotes this song as an
example of the phenomenon that "[l]ove and marriage defy economic analysis." Mapes v.
United States, 576 F.2d 896, 898 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1046 (1978).
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This Article explores the premise that married couples share or
pool their income. It surveys the changing concept and reality of
"family" and examines several empirical studies, including my own,
that address the issue of the allocation of financial resources between
members of a couple living together.2 This focus on "pooling" sheds
new light on the more commonly asked questions about the joint re-
turn: Does it comport with theoretical concepts of income? Does it
promote family values? Should it (and the tax system generally) pro-
mote family values? Is it justified by other concerns such as economic
ones?
Many people believe that the joint return is necessary because it
promotes family values. To the extent that the return does so, it does
so poorly. The joint return discriminates against many groups that
provide their members with the same values of responsibility, caring,
sharing, and support that traditional families provide. Moreover, con-
trary to popular myth, the joint return harms many traditional fami-
lies, as was highlighted by the debates on the 1993 tax law. Under the
new marginal rates, two single individuals living together who each
earn $115,000 would pay $4,500 less tax than two married individuals
earning the same amounts.3 By "penalizing" the second worker, the
joint return discourages married couples from having a second earner
(usually the wife), putting both psychological and economic stress on
these families, on the wife in particular.
The joint return, as all students of tax know, is the result of two
Supreme Court cases, Lucas v. Earl4 and Poe v. Seaborn.5 In Lucas,
the Court stated that couples could not split their income, despite a
valid contract that assigned money earned by one spouse to the other.
2. Whether couples pool income has significance in many other fields, such as di-
vorce and inheritance law. This Article focuses, however, on the tax consequence of pool-
ing only as it affects the choice between the individual or the family as the proper unit of
taxation.
3. Under § 1(a) and (c), the 36% bracket affects individuals with income in excess of
$115,000 and married couples with income in excess of $140,000. I.R.C. § 1(a) and (c)
(West 1993). Unmarried couples who make $230,000 combined ($115,000 each) remain in
the 31% bracket, whereas married couples with the same income have a 36% marginal
rate. Thus, the married couple would pay $4,500 more tax than the individuals. The $4,500
figure is derived by subtracting $140,000 from $230,000 ($90,000) and then multiplying that
figure by the difference between the 36% and 31% marginal tax rates (5%). The math is
as follows: [($230,000 - $140,000) = $90,000] - [(.36 - .31) = .05] = $4,500. See, e.g., Ellen R.
Schultz, Marriages May Become Too Dear if Changes in Tax Law Go Through, WALL ST.
J., Feb. 18, 1993, at C1. See also infra notes 97-98, 143 and accompanying text for examples
of how marital status affects tax liability.
4. 281 U.S. 111 (1930).
5. 282 U.S. 101 (1930).
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In contrast, the Court in Poe held that in a community property state,
the nonearner spouse would be taxed on half the income of the earner
spouse. 6 As a consequence of these decisions, taxpayers in common-
law states devised various devices, such as trusts, to achieve the in-
come-splitting results that occurred under community property laws.
Additionally, some common-law states began switching to community
property regimes. To stem both practices, in 1948, Congress ended
the tax disparity between community property states and common-law
states by enacting the joint return provision.7 Under this provision
married couples were permitted to split the income of the single-
earner spouse just as in community property states.
Part I of this Article briefly describes the social and legal realities
of family living arrangements that contrast with the one-earner, heter-
osexual married couple model upon which the joint return is based.
Part II probes the concept of pooling from a practical standpoint by
examining several empirical studies that address the allocation of fi-
nancial resources by a couple. Part III summarizes the theory and
history of the taxable unit and the taxable unit as it exists today. Part
IV concludes that our tax system ought to use separate, rather than
joint, returns. Taxation based on the individual comports better with
reality, social policies promoting families, tax theory, and economic
considerations than the joint return.
I. Changing Patterns of Living: Changing Legal Patterns
A. What is a Family?
As Martha Minow has rightly observed, "The tension between
official legal forms and functional families has created issues for cen-
turies. ' '8 Today those tensions are greater than ever due to rapid
changes in society. Minow was primarily concerned with new scien-
tific technology enabling procreation to occur in a variety of uncon-
6. There are numerous good histories of the joint return. See sources cited infra note
94. In Lucas, Mr. Earl signed a valid contract with his wife that entitled her to one-half of
whatever he earned. Although this was not an income-avoidance device, since the contract
predated the income tax, the Court held the tax law attributed income in a common-law
property system to the one who earned it. 281 U.S. at 114-15. Thus, Mr. Earl was taxed on
his entire salary. In contrast, the Court held in Poe that the wife was taxed on one-half of
her husband's earnings because of her rights to his earnings under community property
law. 282 U.S. at 106.
7. See Revenue Act of 1948, ch. 168, §§ 301-305, 62 Stat. 110, 114-116 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
8. Martha Minow, Redefining Families: Who's In and Who's Out?, 62 U. CoLO. L.
Rv. 269, 270 (1991).
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ventional ways. Other changes, however, have affected living
arrangements dramatically and increased tension between legal forms
of families and functional families. For example, longer life-spans
have resulted in a greater population of elderly, many of whom live
together as economic units.9 In the past few decades women's em-
ployment opportunities have expanded, in turn affecting their choice
of living arrangements and their roles within the family. The current
state of the economy requires that more families have two earners for
the family to achieve an acceptable living standard. Finally, standards
of morality have shifted, removing much of the stigma attached to the
cohabitation of unmarried heterosexual couples and to homosexual
couples.
The major demographic changes of the past thirty years-declin-
ing fertility, rising divorce rates, increasing rates of out-of-wedlock
births, aging population' 0-have caused the decline of the traditional
nuclear family and an increase in the number of divorces, single-par-
ent families, nonmarried cohabitation, and two-earner families.'1
Nonmarital households in the United States increased nearly 400 per-
cent from 1970 to March 1991.12 The rapid rise in nontraditional liv-
9. Paula Dressel & Beth Hess, Alternatives for the Elderly, in CONTEMPORARY FAMI-
LIES AND ALTERNATIVE LIFESTYLES 271, 277-81 (Eleanor D. Macklin & Roger H. Rubin
eds., 1983).
10. Constance Sorrentino, The Changing Family in International Perspective,
MONTHLY LAB. REV., Mar. 1990, at 41, 55.
11. The changes are not unique to the United States, but are common to the major
developed countries. The United States is both a trend setter and a trend follower; it has
the highest incident of divorce and single-parent families, but trails behind other countries,
especially Scandinavia, in unmarried cohabitations. Id. at 46, 55. These changes have also
affected the relationships within each unit. See infra Part I.B.
12. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES
tbl. 56 (112th ed. 1992) [hereinafter STAT. ABSTRACT]. There were 1,094,000 nonfamily
households in 1970 and 4,440,000 in March 1991. In 1988, nonfamily households comprised
4.4% of total households, but only 1.7% in 1970. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CHANGES
IN AMERICAN FAMILY LIFE, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS ser. P-23, no. 163 (1989), at
10 [hereinafter CHANGES IN AMERICAN FAMILY LIFE]. The figures are difficult to grasp.
For example, Table No. 71, "Nonfamily Households, by Age of Householder and Presence
of Nonrelatives: 1980 to 1991," shows a steady growth of households in which a nonrela-
tive was present-from 2,930,000 in 1980, to 4,258,000 in 1990, to 4,400,000 in 1991. STAr.
ABSTRACT, supra, at tbl. 71. A householder is the first adult household member listed on
the questionnaire, which calls for listing first the person (or one of them) in whose name
the home is owned or rented. Id. at 6.
One of the difficulties in dealing with statistics about nonmarital families is the lack of
agreement over the definition. The statistics of some countries, such as Canada, Sweden,
and France, include unmarried cohabitants within the definition of a married couple. Sor-
rentino, supra note 10, at 47 n.1. In 1980, the United Nations recommended that for pur-
poses of population censuses, "couples living in consensual unions should be regarded as
married couples." Id. at 57 (citing UNITED NATIONS, PRINCIPLES AND RECOMMENDATIONS
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 45
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ing arrangements calls into question assumptions about patterns of
sharing resources, as well as the concept of family itself.
Existing data in the United States for studying the growth of non-
traditional groups that may pool resources is not entirely satisfactory.
The major unit of classification in the U.S. Census, the primary source
of American population statistics, is the "household," which consists
of "all persons who occupy a 'housing unit.' ... A person living alone
or in a group of unrelated persons sharing the same housing unit is
also counted as a household."'1 3 However, this term and definition
give no indication of how the members of a group live; they do not
reveal whether people in a household cohabitate, or more importantly
for tax purposes, whether they pool resources.
The household concept encompasses people who physically live
together, but who may not be an economic unit because they do not
pool resources.14 Thus, roommates may count as one household for
census purposes, but may only share the rent on the apartment. In
contrast, two or more people may live together and share all expenses.
People may live together either in a platonic or intimate sexual rela-
tionship, or they may live in a religious community or a hippie com-
mune. In each situation people can and do share resources. These
people functioning as one economic unit must be examined in discuss-
ing the taxable unit. However, people may function as an economic
unit even if they do not live in the same house. Children may support
their parents and vice versa. Nonrelated men and women also can
support each other.'5
Flawed as they are, the statistics indicate the decline of the tradi-
tional, one-earner nuclear family on which both the joint return and
the married couple as taxable unit are based. For example, the statis-
FOR POPULATION AND HOUSING CENSUSES, STATISTICAL PAPERS, ser. M, No. 67, at 72).
In the United States, however, "married couple" in official documents refers to a husband
and wife living together in the same household. STAT. ABSTRACt, supra, at 6.
13. Id. Comparative studies are further complicated by the varying definitions coun-
tries give to the terms. See supra note 12. The Census itself has trouble defining the term.
In prior years, such as 1977, the term required that the "household head share.., the living
quarters with an unrelated adult of the opposite sex." Eleanor D. Macklin, Nonmarital
Heterosexual Cohabitation: An Overview, in CoNTEMPORARY FAImms AND ALTERNA-
TrvE LiPsTYLES, supra note 9, at 49, 50.
14. Census subcategories of "family" and "nonfamily" have similar problems; for tax
purposes, they do not adequately distinguish groups that share resources from groups that
do not.
15. Traditionally men have supported mistresses. In a more modem variation, women




tics show a sharp rise in one-parent families,16 in dual-earner
couples,17 and in nontraditional families.' 8
The difficulty in defining "family" reflects uncertainty among
both lay people and experts.' 9 As the varieties of living arrangements
blossom, so does the confusion about the definition of "family." In a
recent survey, ten percent of respondents said a childless couple was
16. From 1970 to 1988, they more than doubled, and in 1988 they comprised 27% of
all families with children under 18. CHANGES IN AMERICAN FAMILY LIFE, supra note 12,
at 13. While only about 22% of white families with children had single parents, 59% of
black families with children had single parents. Id. A variety of reasons for the presence
of a single-parent family exist, such as divorce, widowhood, and out-of-wedlock births.
17. The proportion of all married-couple families with both partners working in-
creased from 37% in 1976 to 49% in 1987. Moreover, among married couples with the
wife between 18 and 44 years old, the proportion with only the husband employed and wife
and child(ren) at home (the model for the joint return) dropped from 43% in 1976 to 28%
in 1987. Meanwhile, dual-earner couples with children rose from 33% to 46%. CHANGES
IN AMERICAN FAMILY LIFE, supra note 12, at 18. The text of Changes in American Family
Life does not, however, match the accompanying chart, which shows that in 1976 both
spouses were employed in 44.8% of married couples and by 1987 the percent of dual-
earner couples had risen to 59.7%. Id.
Even in 1948, the one-earner couple, upon which the joint return is premised, was not
universal. In 1950, 33.9% of all married women participated in the work force. STAFF OF
JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 96TH CONG., 2D SEss., THE INCOME TAX TREATMENT OF
MARRIED COUPLES AND SINGLE PERSONS 64 (comm. print 1980) [hereinafter INCOME TAX
TREATMENT].
The two-earner deduction enacted in 1986 reflected this increase in the number of
dual-earner couples. The Joint Committee reported an increase of female participation in
the marketplace from 33.9% in 1950 to 51% in 1979. Id. Table A-i, at 64. Participation in
the labor force means either holding a job or looking for one. Of women in their "princi-
pal child-bearing years (25-34)," only 34% participated in 1950 versus 63.8% in 1979. Id.
In 1960, 37.7% of the civilian labor force consisted of women. Of the women working,
31.9% had husbands present; 41.6% were widowed, divorced, or separated; and 58.6%
were single. In 1991, 57.3% of the civilian labor force was women: 58.5% had husbands
present; 46.8% were widowed, divorced, or separated; and 66.5% were single. STAT. AB-
STRACT, supra note 12, at tbl. 619 (including women age 16 and older in the civilian, nonin-
stitutional population).
The Census does have a table analyzing unmarried couples. However, its definition of
an "unmarried couple" as "two unrelated adults of the opposite sex sharing the same
household" limits its usefulness in studying pooling of assets. For instance, the table ex-
cludes all same-sex couples who share. STAT. ABSTRACT, supra note 12, at tbl. 52.
18. See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text.
19. One researcher's definition of the difference between family and household is,
"[Wihile household may refer to the traditional co-residence and food- and fire-sharing,
family may reflect kinship ties which extend beyond household." Susan Scrimshaw, Com-
bining Quantitative and Qualitative Methods in the Study of Intra-Household Research Al-
location in Intra-Household Resource Allocation, in INTRA-HOUSEHOLD RESOURCE
ALLOCATION ISSUES AND METHODS FOR DEVELOPMENT POLICY AND PLANNING 86, 92
(Beatrice Lorge Rogers & Nina Schlossman eds., 1990) [hereinafter INTRA-HOUSEHOLD
RESOURCE ALLOCATION]. A household may get some (or most) of its resources from its
family, as when a young couple is subsidized by parents. Id. at 93.
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not a family and only seventy-three percent thought the term "family"
included an unwed father living with his children.20 For some people,
a family is self-defined: If you think you're part of a family, then you
are.21 Under such a broad definition, components of a family need
not live under the same roof.
Some European researchers focus on the "criterion of common
residence or common residence under marriage-like conditions (e.g.,
'two adult persons of different sex living together under marriage-like
conditions in the same household without having officially confirmed
their relationship through marriage')." 22 Their definition combines el-
ements of "family" with "household." However, this definition obvi-
ously omits several kinds of living arrangements in which the
members consider themselves a family unit, such as same-sex couples
and nonsexual living arrangements.
Other cohabitation researchers believe that the essence of a fam-
ily is the commitment of the members. If commitment is key, then
sexual cohabitation and gender of partners is irrelevant. For instance,
two same-sex adults, one adult and her children, or three adult siblings
can comprise a family unit.
Some cohabitation researchers have stated that commitment has
two aspects:
(1) personal commitment, or the extent to which one is personally
dedicated to continuing the relationship; and (2) behavioral or
structural commitment, i.e., acts, and the consequences of those
acts, that tend to bind one into a relationship (e.g., the extent to
which others know of the relationship and support its continuing,
the number of possessions owned in common, and the changes one
would have to make in one's life were one to leave).3
20. In contrast, 81% applied the term to a never-married mother living with her chil-
dren. Alan L. Otten, Giving Definition to Family Makeup, WALL ST. J., Jan. 4, 1993, at Bi
(analyzing survey conducted by the Roper Organization). It is also interesting to note that
84% defined family to include a divorced mother living with her children, and 80% in-
cluded a divorced father living with his children in the definition. Almost everyone-but
not everyone-said a married couple living with their children was a family. Id.
21. See Macklin, supra note 13, at 55-56 (referring to definitions of cohabitation).
22. Id. at 56 (citing C.L. Cole, Cohabitation in Social Context, Marriage and Alterna-
tives, in MARRAGE AND ALTERNATVFS: EXPLORING INTIATE RELATIONSHIPS 62, 79
(R.W. Libby & R.N. Whitehurst eds., 1977)). k
23. Macklin, supra note 13, at 60. Catherine Chilman, Fred Cox, and Elam Nunnally
define family "to mean two or more people in a committed relationship from which they
derive a sense of identity as a family." Catherine Chilman et al., Variant Family Forms, in 5
FAMILY IN TROUBLE SERIES 10, 10 (Catherine S. Chilman et al. eds., 1988). Some teen-
ager-on-the-street interviews confirm the "commitment" definition of family. In response
to the question of what is a family, a 17-year-old from Staten Island replied: "Your family
is people who love you, people who love you and are going to support you through thick
November 1993]
The commitment definition of family is well suited for the purpose of
determining a taxable unit on economic grounds because it is based on
functions such as sharing resources, rather than on arguably irrelevant
factors such as legal status or bloodlines. Some courts have applied
this functional approach to expand the concept of family.24
and thin." Children of the Shadows: Shaping Young Lives; I Want to Be the First One to
Stay Married, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 1993, at 121. An 18-year-old from Brooklyn expressed
similar sentiments: Family is "friends, when we're all gathered around. I can go to them
for any support, love and understanding." Id.
In 1973 the American Home Economics Association defined family as "two or more
individuals who share goals, resources and a commitment over a period of time." Quoted
in Kris Franklin, "A Family Like Any Other Family": Alternative Methods of Defining
Family in Law, 18 REV. OF L. & Soc. CHANGE 1027, 1029 (1990-91).
For a variety of definitions of "family," see Mary P. Treuthart, Adopting A More Real-
istic Definition of "Family", 26 GONZ. L. REV. 91, 96-99 (1991). Treuthart cites a 1989
survey by the Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Company in which approximately
three-fourths of the randomly selected adult respondents used a functional definition of
family as "a group of people who love and care for one another," rather than a traditional
definition based on blood, marriage, or adoption. Id. at 97.
24. See, e.g., Braschi v. Stahl Assocs. Co., 543 N.E.2d 49,53 (N.Y. 1989) (holding that
a man could inherit a rent-controlled apartment from his male lover under a law that
stated a landlord cannot evict "either the surviving spouse or some other member of the
deceased tenant's family who has been living with the tenant"); Curry v. Dempsey, 520 F.
Supp. 70, 72, 74 (W.D. Mich. 1981) (finding that, while the relationship was not directly
approved for aid from Aid for Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), legal guardians
unrelated to their wards would ensure an adequate home environment for a child), rev'd,
701 F.2d 580 (6th Cir. 1983). The Supreme Court has stated that the "family unit accorded
traditional respect in our society ... is typified, of course, by the marital family, but also
includes the household of unmarried parents and their children. Perhaps the concept can
be expanded even beyond this .... Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 123 n.3 (1989).
In January 1993, New York City Mayor Dinkins signed an executive order allowing
domestic partners to register at City Hall. Partners must be at least 18 years old, be unre-
lated, attest that they have "a close and committed personal relationship," and swear
before a notary that they have lived together before registering (no specified length of time
is required). These registered domestic partners qualify for apartments and inheriting
leases in residential buildings owned or overseen by the city's housing body. Alan Finder,
Rights of 'Domestic Partners' Broadened by Dinkins Order, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 1993, at Al;
see also infra notes 26-27. The executive order achieves the same result as that in Braschi.
Partners register at City Hall by signing a notarized affidavit and paying a $20 fee.
Partners may terminate their registration upon payment of a $15 fee. Jonathan P. Hicks, A
Legal Threshold Is Crossed by Gay Couples in New York, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 1993, at Al.
Some courts have also created a pooling between unmarried cohabitants by implying
contract rights between them that give one member rights in the other's property. The
leading case in this area is Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976). See, e.g., Rebecca L.
Melton, Note, Legal Rights of Unmarried Heterosexual and Homosexual Couples and
Evolving Definitions of "Family", 29 J. FAM. L. 497, 508 (1991) (noting that California was
one of the first states to recognize property rights of unmarried cohabitants through im-
plied contract).
There has been a recent spate of articles, especially student notes, on the issue of
changing definitions of family and the evolving legal rights of these nontraditional groups.
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The main problem with such a functional approach is uncertainty.
Whether a court will uncover enough factors to find the arrangement
the functional equivalent of a family is unpredictable. 25 Moreover, as
Martha Minow suggests, a functional approach may lead to abuse of
the system by those who wish to be treated as a married couple for
some but not all purposes.26 Finally, basing tax liability on a func-
Franklin, supra note 23, at 1027; see, e.g., Treuthart, supra note 23, at 91 (explaining that
broader (ie., more functional) judicial or legislative definitions of family would help, but
the ultimate solution may be that benefits should not be based on marital or family status);
John C. Beattie, Note, Prohibiting Marital Status Discrimination: A Proposal for the Pro-
tection of Unmarried Couples, 42 HASTINS LJ. 1415, 1416 (1991) (proposing that state
laws prohibiting marital status discrimination can help protect nontraditional families);
Melton, supra, at 516 (proposing that courts should focus on the "societal interests of pro-
tecting long-term, supportive relationships," even if they are not considered traditional
families, in order to "fashion flexible remedies to support the parties' reasonable expecta-
tions"); Note, Looking For a Family Resemblance: The Limits of the Functional Approach
to the Legal Definition of Family, 104 HARv. L. RIv. 1640, 1641, 1657-59 (1991) (conclud-
ing that a functional approach should be abandoned because it is "indeterminate, intrusive,
and most important, unfair with respect to traditional relationships that enjoy legal pre-
sumptions based on blood, adoption, and marriage," and that legislatures should provide
open registration for nontraditional relationships). For a discussion of the moderate ex-
pansion of the rights of nonmarried couples in recent years in both the United States and
the Commonwealth countries, see Carol S. Bruch, Cohabitation in the Common Law
Countries a Decade after Marvin: Settled In or Moving Ahead?, 22 U.C. DAvIs L. Rv.
717, 718 (1989).
25. Minow, supra note 8, at 276.
26. Id. at 277 (using the example of sham marriages for immigration purposes). In the
tax context, the situation is often the reverse; given the "marriage" penalty for two-earner
couples, it is to their advantage to be unmarried. As a consequence, the IRS was often in
the position of arguing that the divorce was a sham, and the couple was married for tax
purposes despite their divorce. See, e.g., Nevitt Ensminger v. Comm'r, 610 F.2d 189 (4th
Cir. 1978).
Because nontraditional families have become so much more prevalent and so much
more accepted, and because family status can be such an important determinant of legal
rights, there is a growing movement to legally recognize nontraditional living arrangements
as families. At least 25 city, county, or state governments have recognized some rights of
unmarried domestic partners, New York City being among the most recent. Jonathan P.
Hicks, A Legal Threshold is Crossed by Gay Couples in New York, N.Y. TiEs, Mar. 2,
1993, at Al. Under the New York City executive order, registered domestic partners em-
ployed by the city have the same right to unpaid child care leave as married partners. All
registered domestic partners can visit their partners in municipal hospitals and jails on the
same bases as married partners. They also have equal status with married couples to qual-
ify for apartments or to inherit residential leases in buildings owned or overseen by the
city. 1d.; see also SEATrLE, WAsH., FAMILY LEAVE ORDNANCE 10,7342 (Aug. 18, 1989),
reprinted in Treuthart, supra note 23, at 104 n.38 (authorizing sick leave and funeral leave
for domestic partners who were registered with the city). San Francisco enacted a similar
domestic partners law in 1990. SAN FRANcisco, CA., ADMm TRATrVE CODE §§ 62.1-62.8
(1991). In November 1991, this law withstood an initiative calling for its repeal. Voters
Force Runoff in San Francisco, CHRIgSTAN Sc. MONITOR, Nov. 7, 1991, at 6. Citations to
various legislative enactments extending some family benefits to alternative living arrange-
ments may be found in Melton, supra note 24, at 503-06. As recognition of nontraditional
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tional approach invites administrative complexity. Proof of pooling,
for example, would require detailed documentation by taxpayers,
probable invasion of privacy by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS),
and most likely increased litigation. Requiring some type of registra-
tion by taxpayers might solve these problems, but might invite abuse
by taxpayers who would choose to be a unit only for tax purposes.
Requiring groups to register as units for all legal purposes could elimi-
nate this abuse, but might be viewed as unduly intrusive.27
arrangements grows, the discrepancy between tax and nontax treatment of couples will
also increase. Such discrepancies create both a fecund ground for the abuse Minow talks
about, and confusion among citizens. It is more difficult for couples to understand what
their legal rights are when they seem to change so whimsically with context: now they are
legally recognized as a couple (or parent or family) and now they are not.
Curry provides an example of the multiplicity of definitions of family and demon-
strates how narrow definitions can defeat the purpose of the law. Plaintiffs had been de-
nied, at the administrative level, AFDC benefits because as legal guardians, they were not
related to their wards as required by the statute and regulations. Health and Human Ser-
vice regulations provided benefits to children if they lived with various relatives, including
uncles, aunts, and first cousins, but not if they lived with unrelated persons, such as the
plaintiffs, even if such person provided for the child materially and emotionally.
The district court ruled that the plaintiffs were entitled to benefits because "[i]t is
apparent ... that the intent of Congress was to provide aid to needy children in many types
of family settings where they would be likely to receive the care, affection, and support
necessary for their development into productive citizens." Curry, 520 F. Supp. at 73. In its
ruling, the court applied a functional approach to the definition of family: "A stable and
nurturing home environment for needy children is what the Act seeks to support, not
merely a living arrangement with someone who happens to share a common ancestor." Id.
at 74.
The court of appeals reversed, holding that Congress did not intend to include legal
guardians within the act's ambit. "Congress was obviously aware that legal guardianship
can be equated ... with parenthood" because it had done so in another act. 701 F.2d at
583 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 675(4)(B) (1988), relating to child welfare services). Determining
how revenues are distributed to improve general public welfare is within Congress's discre-
tion. Id. The appellate court, in contrast to the district court, took a formalist view of the
definitions despite the fact that such a view created inconsistency among related statutes
(thus creating the opportunity for confusion and selectivity among the citizenry) and that
such a formalist view ignored the purpose of the statute and the reality of the living
arrangement.
27. This solution is similar to that adopted by New York City, see Hicks, supra note
26, and San Francisco, see Domestic Partnership Act, SAN FRANCISCO, CA., ADMINISTRA-
TIVE CODE §§ 62.1-62.8. Under these provisions couples register as domestic partnerships.
The problem with this solution is twofold. First, any statutory solution inevitably will in-
clude a definition to provide guidance. Such a definition may, however, still exclude cer-
tain living arrangements in which people pool. See Franklin, supra note 23, at 1066.
Second, couples who currently choose not to marry because they oppose governmental
intrusion into personal affairs would not be covered. Id. at 1065. To solve this second
problem, the statute could simply allow parties to self-define their families by a simple
declaration. Id. at 1069-73. Even under such a system, however, many people might not
file due to laziness, ignorance, or a reluctance to deal with a bureaucracy.
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Income pooling can occur within a multiplicity of living arrange-
ments, not just in marriages. Moreover, the numbers of these types of
relationships are increasing in society. Although documentation of
pooling involves some administrative complexity, the expanding exist-
ence of alternative relationships underscores the growing under-inclu-
siveness of allowing only marital units to file joint returns.
B. Pooling and the Legal and Social Concepts of Marriage
Today the law largely assumes that marriage is based on a part-
nership model. Before 1948, however, two distinct systems provided
the legal underpinnings for the tax treatment of married couples.2
8
First, the community property system treated marriage as a bilateral
contract that created a new relationship-the marital partnership or
community.29 Second, under the traditional common-law system,
ownership followed title, with each spouse retaining ownership, pos-
session, and use of all property acquired before or during marriage.
30
28. See supra notes 2-4 and accompanying text.
29. W.S. McCLA AHAN, CoMMUrr PROPERTY LAW IN THE UNITED STATES § 2:27
(1982). Although the community property states each had somewhat different community
laws, the basic theory was similar: Property was divided into two classes, separate and
community. Community property-generally, property acquired during the marriage-
was deemed to be equally acquired by each spouse. Separate property, consisting of any
property a spouse owned before the marriage, remained the property of the spouse who
owned it prior to the marriage; the other spouse received no interest-present or future-
in it. Additionally, property received during the marriage by gift or inheritance was sepa-
rate property of the recipient spouse. States differ on the issue of whether the earnings on
separately owned property are community property. See, e.g., id. § 2.22; ROBERT L. MEN-
NELL & THoMAs M. BoyKoFF, COMMUNITY PROPERTY IN A NUTSHELL (2d ed. 1988); WIL-
LIAM A. REPPY, JR. & CYNTHIA A. SAMUEL, COMMUNrrY PROPERTY IN THE UNITED
STATES (3d ed. 1991). Additionally, Cynthia Samuel kindly discussed community property
with me at a basic level I could understand. I thank her for her efforts; any mistakes
herein, of course, are mine. See McCLANAHAN, supra, § 2:24, at 34-35, 44-49, and 137-99
for a summary of the different systems.
30. Additionally, in common-law states, each spouse has an interest, probably not
present or vested, in the other spouse's estate upon dissolution of the marriage. McCLAN-
AHAN, supra note 29, § 2:26. These laws vary widely.
Historically, under the common law, a woman lost her property rights when she mar-
ried and the husband gained the right to use and manage all her property and receive her
income, regardless of when or how she acquired the property. In return, she received an
inchoate dower right, which was a mere expectancy that if she survived her husband she
would receive a portion of his estate. Changes in this regime began in the nineteenth
century, and by the turn of the century, most states had enacted a married women's prop-
erty act giving women, among other things, the right "to retain ownership, possession and
use of their personal property, whether acquired before or during marriage, and to acquire,
own, hold, manage and convey real property." Id. § 2:21. The result of such a system was
that marriage was the "equivalent of civil death for the wife." Id. § 2:20 (referring to a
statement by Charles Beard).
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The joint return was created to eliminate the inconsistent tax treat-
ments that arose, according to the Supreme Court, from differing state
marital property systems. 31 Federal tax treatment should not be de-
termined by geographic contingency.
Despite these differences, the two systems were never as separate
as these paradigms suggest. Under both systems, the wage earner
largely controlled the income earned. Although a non-wage earner
spouse in a community property state owned an interest in her hus-
band's income, such an interest was not the equivalent of common-law
ownership.32 Ownership in the common-law sense includes the rights
of management and control, rights that are critical to the proper allo-
cation of income under our tax system.33 Under traditional commu-
nity property laws, the husband had the right to manage and control
community property.34 Although this basic right of management has
been altered35 to give the wife some management rights, community
property rights are not yet identical to common-law ownership be-
31. Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111, 114 (1930).
32. MCCLANAHAN, supra note 29, § 2.31.
33. See infra text accompanying notes 107-108.
34. Bea Ann Smith rejects the traditional view that the early community property
laws treated women as equal partners in the marriage. Rather, she sees these laws "as
attempts to remove married women's severe legal disabilities ... and are similar to the
married women's property acts enacted at the same time in common-law states." Bea Ann
Smith, The Partnership Theory of Marriage: A Borrowed Solution Fails, 68 TEx. L. REv.
689, 692, 697-706 (1990). Smith states, for example, that in the nineteenth century a mar-
ried woman had the same disabilities as an infant; she could own property, but only her
husband could control it. "Marriage could at best be characterized in nineteenth-century
Texas as a limited partnership with the husband as a general partner and the wife as a
limited partner with few rights." Id. at 699.
35. In California, for example, the husband and wife generally have equal rights in the
management and control of community property in that either spouse may manage and
control the community property. CAL. Civ. CODE § 5125 (West 1983 & Supp. 1993).
Texas, in contrast, gives spouses equal, joint control over property, except that each spouse
has sole management rights over community property that the spouse would have owned if
single, such as personal earnings. TEX. FAm. CODE ANN. § 5.22 (West 1993); MENNELL &
Boy OF, supra note 29, at 233. Property is presumed to be subject to the spouse's sole
control and management if it is held in that spouse's name. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.24
(West 1993); accord N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-3-14 (Michie 1989). For a summary of all the
community property statutes, see MCCLANAHAN, supra note 29, ch. 4. As Reppy and Sa-
muel point out, statutory schemes such as New Mexico's and Texas's make the equal man-
agement rights a "mirage rather than a reality. All a laboring spouse need do is put his
paycheck in a bank account in his name alone or invest it in stocks in his name alone, etc.,
and such funds are shifted from equal to one-spouse management." REPPY & SAMUEL,
supra note 29, at 14-3. A spouse deprived of equal management can sue for relief in court,
but generally must prove bad faith. Id.; see also MCCLANAHAN, supra note 29, §§ 9:12 and
9:14 (examining various judicially created remedies for deprivation of equal management).
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cause current community property laws allow many instances of sepa-
rate or sole management of community property.
Traditionally, the power to manage and control determines
whether income should be attributed to a taxpayer. For example, ba-
sic assignment of income principles and the grantor trust rules state
that if a taxpayer has such a power, she is taxed on the income even if
she is not the legal or beneficial owner of the property.3 6 Therefore,
to the extent that current community property laws do not give equal
control to both partners, current tax principles should deny income
splitting. Most importantly, even if ownership under community
property law were identical to common-law ownership, an earner
spouse still exercises ultimate control over his property by having the
choice to follow the community property system. This choice is exer-
cised in two ways: first by choosing to live in a community property
state, and second, and more importantly, by opting to follow the com-
munity property system. Since couples may elect out of community
property, a decision not to do so is an exercise of control over
property.
More recently, the two property systems have become less dis-
tinct. Common-law marital property systems have adopted "equitable
distribution" statutes premised on the same idea as community prop-
erty systems-marriages are partnerships in which the assets are
shared and jointly owned.37 Although equitable distribution princi-
36. See infra note 108 and accompanying text.
37. Elizabeth A. Cheadle, Comment, The Development of Sharing Principles in Com-
mon Law Marital Property States, 28 UCLA L. RPv. 1269, 1282-84 (1981). Common-law
states apply the sharing concept on event of the dissolution of a marriage in several ways.
Two basic methods are:
(1) Deferred approach. Community property principles apply upon divorce, but
not during the marriage. Generally property acquired during the marriage by the
labor of either spouse is community property to be divided equally upon divorce;
property obtained prior to the marriage or acquired during the marriage through
gift or inheritance is separate property.
(2) Equitable distribution approach. Under this approach the court is empow-
ered to distribute the property in an equitable or fair manner regardless of title.
In some states the statutes specify criteria for the judge to use in dividing the
property; in other states the statute is more vague, giving the court even more
discretion.
Ohio's recent legislation, effective January 1, 1991, is a striking example of the importation
of community property principles to common-law states. First, it defines marital property
as all property acquired by either or both spouses during the marriage, including (with
some exceptions) income and appreciation on separate property due to a contribution of
labor or property by either spouse during the marriage; separate property is property ac-
quired prior to the marriage, gifts or inheritances acquired during the marriage, property
subject to a prenuptial agreement, and passive income and appreciation acquired during
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ples ostensibly apply only upon dissolution of the marriage,38 they can
affect sharing during the marriage. In determining equitable distribu-
tion, when a spouse claims that more property would be available for
distribution but for consumption or mismanagement by the other
spouse, the court may consider the dissipated or wasted property
when dividing the remaining property.39 In this manner, the threat of
a future dissipation action may constrain the spouse's use of property
titled in his name. Equitable distribution thus casts a shadow over
traditional property rights that had given the nominal owner exclusive
rights over the property.
The partnership model of marriage now incorporated into both
community property and common-law systems as the basis for the
joint return can be criticized from two perspectives. The first accepts
the validity of the partnership model as an ideal, but holds it irrelevant
for tax purposes. The second line of criticism attacks the paradigm of
the marital partnership.
The first line of criticism argues that even if the partnership para-
digm is true, tax policy requires taxation of the individual. As Part III
shows, basic tax principles dictate that if a person retains significant
control over an asset, she is taxed on the income generated by the
asset, regardless of who benefits from it. Under both the community
property and common-law systems, the earner retains significant con-
the marriage from separate property. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3105.17(A) (Anderson
1992). Marital property is to be divided equally, unless such a distribution is inequitable, in
which case the court is to divide property equitably considering such factors as duration of
marriage, assets, and liabilities of each spouse. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3105.17(C), (E),
(F) (Anderson 1992); see Smith, supra note 34, at 724-29 (discussing other common-law
equitable distribution statutes).
38. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3105.17(A).
39. Lewis Becker, Conduct of a Spouse That Dissipates Property Available for Equita-
ble Property Distribution: A Suggested Analysis, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 95, 97-98 (1991) (stating
that the court also "may make an offset for the dissipated property by considering the
property as still being available for distribution, awarding the dissipated property to the
dissipating spouse, and awarding a corresponding amount of property to the other
spouse"). It is difficult to determine precise guidelines for when an action constitutes dis-
sipation, and courts seem to decide cases on an ad hoc basis. See generally id. at 111-16
(discussing expenditures and conduct constituting dissipation). Of course, the generally
hostile setting of the divorce or dissolution may frequently color a spouse's allegations
about whether past actions of the other spouse were dissipating actions.
While the scope of the dissipation doctrine is unclear, it always affects to some extent
the spouse in whose name the property is titled by imposing constraints on that spouse's
ability to control the property. Nevertheless, no court has so broadly interpreted dissipa-
tion so as to take away from the owner all vestiges of control and management of the
property. For example, some courts hold that the doctrine may be considered only after
there has been a breakdown of the marriage; others focus on intent; still others focus on
the nature of the dissipating expenditure. Id. at 105-07.
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trol over property. Moreover, earners exercise control over money
they earn in the most basic sense because they choose whether to
work. Finally, as Part II shows, earners retain power over resources
once earned.
40
The second line of criticism has several variations, all of which
question the appropriateness of the partnership model of marriage in
light of today's society. One branch of this criticism notes that the
whole idea of a marital partnership is faulty because it is premised on
the ideal of equality and women are not equal partners in reality.41
The idea of community property, another view holds, is based on a
model in which one spouse works outside the home and the other
cares for the home and children. Given the growing participation of
women in the work force, such a model is no longer appropriate.42
The most radical variation of the second line of criticism ques-
tions the very premise of the partnership model by asserting the rise
of individualism and autonomy in marriage. In every marriage a ten-
sion exists between "the community of life that marriage involves and
the separate, autonomous existence of the individuals who are associ-
ated in this community of life."43 As an individualistic society, we rec-
40. See infra notes 48-90 and accompanying text.
41. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 34, at 732-36. Martha Fineman states that for many in
the divorce reform movement, equality, in the guise of partnership, provided the measure
of ultimate fairness from which both to argue women's victimization and to fashion the
solution to it. The theory was that a housewife-partner's tasks were to be equally valued
with her husband's economic contribution. MARTHA ALBERTSON FnrEMAN, Tim ILLUSION
OF EQUALITY: THE RHETORIC AND REALITY oF DIVORCE REFORM 4 (1992).
Fineman finds several problems with this approach. First, most women contribute
more than half of the marriage's total economic production by means of outside work and
household work. As a consequence, "[o]ne could view them as deserving more than an
equal partnership share." Id. at 4. "Moreover, from a result-equality perspective,
[Fmneman] argue[s] that, metaphors and paradigms aside, the economic and social inequali-
ties women as a group suffer in society are such that an equal share of assets is seldom
sufficient to provide security for women and children after divorce." Id. at 4-5. This is
especially true since women typically assume more care for the children after divorce than
men, despite joint custody agreements. Id. Finally, pre-reform divorce law took into ac-
count the wife's economic dependence. See LENORE J. WErrZMAN, THE DIVORCE
REVOLUTION: THE UNEXPECrED SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN
AND CHILDREN IN AMERICA 70 (1985).
42. Mary Ann Glendon, Is There A Future for Separate Property?, 8 FAM L.Q. 315,
318-21 (1974) [hereinafter Glendon, Future]; MARY ANN GLENDON, THE TRANSFORMA-
TION OF FAMILY LAW 123-35 (1989) [hereinafter GLENDON, TRANSFORMATION].
43. Glendon, Future, supra note 42, at 323; see also Judith T. Younger, Light Thoughts
and Night Thoughts on the American Family, 76 MINN. L. REv. 891, 898 (1992) ("[C]ultural
emphasis on self-fulfillment inhibits the creation of stable families.").
Lenore Weitzman believes the divorce reforms "reflect larger cultural themes: the rise
of individualism, the emphasis on personal fulfillment, the belief in personal responsibility,
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ognize that, though we have much in common with others, each
individual also has her own needs and interests that differ from those
of even her close loved ones. A single person, therefore, cannot al-
ways speak or act for the couple or the family unit. Our desire for
independence and the separateness of our needs and interests illumi-
nate the fallacy of the partnership model and its premise of unity.
This mythic unity was based on the hegemony of the Husband and
Father.44 The breakdown of this hegemony and the rise of the individ-
ual argues against total pooling; members of families who desire to
retain some measure of emotional and financial independence fre-
quently keep some or all of their assets separately. This separation of
assets might be particularly true in nontraditional families, but it is
also true in traditional families.45
and the importance we attach to individual 'rights."' WErrZMAN, supra note 41, at 374. To
her, the new divorce laws reward individual achievement (as in the acquisition of a profes-
sional degree), rather that investment in the family partnership and a common financial
future with obligations extending beyond the termination of a marriage. The new laws,
which provide minimal child support, little or no alimony, and only half of tangible assets,
"convey a clear message to the young woman who is planning her future. They tell her that
divorce may send her into poverty if she invests in her family ahead of-or even alongside
of-her career." Id. at 372-73. If the major asset of the family, the earning capacity of the
breadwinner, is not available to the housewife either as joint property or alimony, then the
only safe course for the wife is to invest in her own career, not her spouse's.
Professor Elizabeth Scott agrees that today's marriages are based on the idea of self-
fulfillment, but states that the common interpretation of such marriages is incorrect. Citing
to other scholars, she posits a model of marriage in which individuals find self-fulfillment
through the vehicle of a committed, long-term marriage. Elizabeth S. Scott, Rational Deci-
sionmaking About Marriage and Divorce, 76 VA. L. REV. 9, 23-24 (1990).
Professor Carl Schneider finds that emphasis on the individual, rather than on the
family entity, is reflected in various facets of family law, including no-fault divorce, short
periods of alimony, and abortion. Carl E. Schneider, Moral Discourse and the Transforma-
tion of American Family Law, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1803, 1856-57 (1985). He notes, for exam-
ple, that in the area of contraception the Court switched from viewing the right to privacy
as residing in the marital relationship (as it did in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965)), to residing in the individual:
[T]he marital couple is not an independent entity with a mind and heart of its
own, but an association of two individuals each with a separate intellectual and
emotional makeup. If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the
individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted government intrusion.
Id. at 1856 (citing Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972)).
44. Id. at 1859-60 (asserting that the breakdown of the family unit is the breakdown of
the hegemony of the father); see also infra note 104 and accompanying text.
45. See PHILIP BLUMSTEIN & PEPPER SCHWARTZ, AMERICAN COUPLES 47 (1983)
[hereinafter AMERICAN COUPLES]. Even in traditional patriarchal marriages, women are
often given "pin" money to give them some small measure of independence. In the more
comfortable strata of English society in former times, an amount of income for the wife
was often settled as part of the marriage negotiations because it was "better that young
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Even within the traditional family unit, changes have transformed
the nature of the relationship. Once the family was the major deter-
minant of social and economic status. As a consequence, the individ-
ual was an inseparable part of the family whose job was to benefit the
unit. Today the family still plays an important role in an individual's
social and economic status, but the individual is not nearly as depen-
dent on the family for social and economic achievement. 46 Conse-
quently, the individual's goals are no longer identical to the family's.
Therefore, individual fulfillment, not familial fulfillment, is now the
objective; the family serves the individual, rather than vice versa.47 If
the family is not a monolithic entity, but the vehicle through which the
individual finds satisfaction, then logic dictates that pooling is not uni-
versal, as is commonly assumed, because an individual's resources
would serve her own rather than the family's interests.
married women should have a fixed income .... They knew then what they ought to
spend, and all their little charities, or any presents they wished to give would be the fruits
of their own self-denial; ... [even] the most devoted and liberal husbands would, after a
certain term of married life, object to milliners' bill...." EMiLY EDEN, THE SEMI-DE-
TACHED HousE 114 (Houghton-Mifflin 1948) (1859).
46. The declining role of the family as a determinant of the economic and social status
of an individual has increased stress on the individual. GLENDON, TRANSFORMATION,
supra note 42, at 292. Glendon quotes a French jurist, Alain Benabent, as illustrating this
point:
Instead of the individual "belonging" to the family, it is the family which is com-
ing to be at the service of the individual. The preeminent place of the family
among our institutions is retained, but not for the same reason: no longer is it
because the family serves society, but because it is a means for the fullest develop-
ment of the individual. When it no longer fulfills this role, the bonds diminish or
disappear.
Id. at 292-93 (quoting ALAIN BENABENT, LA LmERTE ImrviDIELLE ET LE MARR GE,
REVuE TRIMESRIELLE Du DRorr CIVIL 440, 495 (1973)).
Obviously, this position is extreme; in reality the family serves the individual and vice
versa. The point is that there has been movement along a continuum towards the individ-
ual and away from the family. One reason there can be a greater stress on the individual is
that the individual is no longer as economically dependent on the family as in earlier times,
when the whole family worked on the farm or in the small family business in order to
provide support for all.
47. Professor Praeger, among others, believes that individualism is overstated. Susan
Westerberg Praeger, Sharing Principles and the Future of Marital Property Law, 25 UCLA
L. REv. 1, 6 (1977). For example, even two-earner couples may still share assets and deci-
sions. Spouses may make decisions regarding their jobs based on the needs of the other
spouse (where to live, for example) or of the family (one spouse takes time off, or takes a
less demanding job so as to care for children). So long as this interdependency exists she
believes that sharing principles have relevancy, even in a two-earner world with no sex
discrimination. Id. at 6-10. She states, for example, that one spouse may forego her most
desired job because it is in a city in which the other spouse cannot find a job or does not
wish to live, and one spouse's job may be affected, temporarily or permanently, by the
other's educational needs or family needs. Id. at 8.
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H. Empirical Studies of Asset Pooling and Control Sharing
A. Difficulty of Data Interpretation
The theoretical justification for the joint return-the belief that
married couples share resources-is largely unsupported by empirical
evidence.48 Recently, however, a number of studies have explored in-
tra-family allocations because of a growing recognition of this issue's
importance to a wide array of social welfare programs.49 These stud-
ies indicate "that individual incomes are not simply pooled and then
spent to meet household needs in some unified fashion. Rather, they
are spent at least in part according to the earner's own preference.
50
As Michael Young has stated, "The bread-winners are often the meat-
eaters." 51 This apportionment phenomenon is true even when the
couple states that they pool or share resources.
48. There is little literature on intra-family allocation of income-as opposed to allo-
cation among families. As one commentator has said: "We know less about money mat-
ters [within a family] than about family violence or even marital sex." Viviana Zelizer, The
Social Meaning of Money: "Special Monies," 95 AM. J. Soc. 342, 352 (1989). This dearth
of information results in part because major data banks, such as the Census, only provide
information on the family as a whole, not on income allocation within the family. Other
reasons for using the family or household as the unit of analysis are: (1) Many consump-
tion decisions are made at the family level, such as where to live; (2) Like public goods,
there are many "family" goods, the use of which by one family member does not preclude
the use by another (for example, the security of a home, or shared durables); (3) Many
nonpecuniary resources, such as leisure, are allocated within the family and affect resource
allocation but are difficult to measure; and (4) "[Tlhe family festers with externalities."
EDWARD LAZEAR & ROBERT MICHAEL, ALLOCATION OF INCOME WITHIN THE HOUSE-
HOLD 19-21 (1988). Lazear and Michael's book is one of the exceptions to the typical
neglect of intra-family allocations. The focus of their work is the allocation between adults
and children. Even the long-running (20-plus years) A Panel Study of Income Dynamics,
conducted by the Institute for Social Research at the University of Michigan, which studies
over 7,000 households, does not examine intra-household resource allocation. It does ask,
however, some questions about intra-family allocation, such as whether respondents had
given or received help from parents or other relatives. On the need for research in this
area, see Louise Dulude, Taxation of the Spouses: A Comparison of Canadian, American,
British, French and Swedish Law, 23 OsOooD HALL L. J. 1, 88 (1985); Julie A. Nelson, Tax
Reform and Feminist Theory in the United States Context: Incorporating Human Connec-
tion, 18 J. EcoN. STUD. 11, 11 (1991); Praeger, supra note 47, at 7.
49. 1 or example, money given to the "family" to provide food for sick children will
not necessarily-be used for that purpose. Which family member receives the money can
affect whether it ultimately is used for the program's purpose (child nutrition) or is redi-
rected to another use. Beatrice Lorge Rogers, The Internal Dynamics of Households: A
Critical Factor in Development Policy, in INTRA-HOUSEHOLD RESOURCE ALLOCATION,
supra note 19, at 1, 1-3.
50. Id. at 1.
51. Michael Young, The Distribution of Income Within the Family, 3 BR. J. Soc. 305,
314 (1952), cited in LAZEAR & MICHAEL, supra note 48, at 14-15. Young found that in
British working-class families between World Wars I and II, the male earner gave his wife a
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In the spring of 1991 I began exploring this issue further by con-
ducting my own informal survey. First, I simply talked to a variety of
people in order to get a feel for the issue and its complexities. Anec-
dotal evidence I received from interviewing various people prior to
undertaking my survey supported my hypothesis that in America to-
day, pooling is less monolithic in reality than it is in theory. Col-
leagues, friends, and near strangers were amazingly willing, even
eager, to speak of their financial arrangements. I believe that their
willingness sprang from the economically and psychologically convo-
luted nature of the issue. Because couples were grappling with these
issues, they were eager to discuss them and hear how others handle
these problems. The people with whom I talked used a wide variety
of financial systems, which were often quite complicated. Nominal ti-
tle to assets did not even begin to touch on the reality of what was
"mine, his, and ours."
The complexity and sensitivity of the issue makes allocation of
financial resources within a couple a phenomenon that is difficult, if
not impossible, to capture precisely in a survey. Respondents' state-
ments about whether they pool or believe in pooling are not totally
reliable. Spouting vague generalities about sharing is easy, especially
when such sentiments are approved morally by tradition.52 It is also
unclear what a person really means when he states he practices or at
least believes in pooling assets: 53 Is it pooling when one person makes
fiat weekly allowance and disposed of the rest of the income as he wished. The wife fre-
quently was ignorant of how much he made and how he spent it. Young, supra, at 314.
52. Interviews in a study by Jan Pahl noted the discrepancies between what couples
stated in their joint interview and the realities each partner described in a separate inter-
view. JAN PAHL, MONEY AND MARRIAGE 83-84 (1989).
53. The notorious gender gap is a major obstacle in evaluating family financial mat-
ters. According to sociologist William Aguilino, spouses tend to lie about money matters
when discussing them in the presence of the other spouse: Men say they earn less than
they actually do while women overstate their earnings. Gender Gap-It's All Talk, THE
PLAiN DEALER (Cleveland), Apr. 23, 1992, at 6D; see also Honesty Not Best Marital Pol-
icy?, THE TIMEs-PicAYuNE (New Orleans), Nov. 18, 1992, at E-3 ("Sixty-six percent of
married women surveyed by McCall's magazine said it is ethical to hide a portion of their
spending money in a secret stash."). People also view the same situation differently. Pahl
gives a superb description of the many problems in analyzing financial allocations within a
family. Despite what the spouses say, reality is often different. Additionally, the reality
often differs within a family unit. Pahl notes that the interviewers for her study "remarked
on the disparities between claims made by the couple in the joint interview and the practi-
cal realities described in the separate interviews." PAUL, supra note 52, at 83-84. More-
over, Pahl notes the great difference between control and management:
Control is mainly exercised at the point where money enters the household. It is
concerned with decisions such as which allocative system should be adopted
within the household, which spouse should have the final say on major financial
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all the decisions? Is it pooling when both partners nominally make
the decisions, but in reality one partner is so subservient that she al-
ways yields-consciously or unconsciously-to the dominant partner?
Is it really pooling if he says "my assets are your assets," but mean-
while they are all titled in his name so that legally he can do whatever
he wishes with them? Is it really pooling when she does not even
know what all the assets are?
Factual descriptions of how assets are held can also be mislead-
ing; nominal or legal status of parties does not always represent how
people really treat their financial assets. For example, joint accounts
often are treated as separate accounts and separate accounts are
viewed frequently as joint assets. As a consequence, simple tabulation
of responses might look accurate and precise, but really could be de-
ceptive. To illustrate, a respondent may check the answer "separate
accounts" when asked how the couple holds its money, but a fuller
inquiry may reveal that the separate accounts are really for conven-
ience. For instance, the wife may pay household bills out of her sepa-
rate account while the husband pays other bills out of his.
Individually, this may appear to be separate financing, but taken as a
whole the couple may in fact be pooling their resources and just divid-
ing up the responsibilities for making payments.5 4
decisions, and with the extent to which spouses have control over personal spend-
ing money of their own and access to joint money.
Management is concerned with putting into operation the particular alloca-
tive system which the couple have adopted. Household expenditure takes place
within a number of different categories, such as food, fuel, clothes, rent or mort-
gage, insurance, transportation, leisure activities and so on. The management
function can extend over all of these categories or it may be confined to just one
or two.
Id. at 57.
The difference between management and control is unclear. Pahl states, for example,
that in the joint interview, only three couples disagreed as to who managed the money, but
in the separate interview "29 of the 102 couples disagreed about who 'controlled' the
money." Id. at 79. Certain factual patterns frequently correlated with the manner of man-
agement and control, but not entirely; the spouse in charge of checking the bank statement
was usually seen as the person who controlled the finances. Id. at 85-87. Pooling couples
more frequently had joint accounts than nonpoolers. Id. at 85. Within this group of 66
pooling couples with joint accounts, the wife controlled the finances in 41% (27) of the
couples and the husband controlled in 59%. Id. at 89.
54. One of my random respondents, for example, stated that wages were held sepa-
rately and that income from investments, gifts, and inheritances were all held partly jointly,
partly separately. In the question asking for a brief description of finances, he stated that
while he paid all bills, she took care of food, and they split day care and child's clothing,
even though he made more money than she did. Random Study Questionnaire # 39. An-
other random respondent stated that all checking, saving, and money market accounts, as
Conversely, assets may be jointly titled, but in reality treated as
separate. Several questionnaire respondents and interviewees stated
that they had two joint checking accounts. However, each partner
knew that one account belonged to each partner. The accounts were
titled jointly only for convenience, so that, for example, when one
partner travelled frequently the other could make necessary deposits.
Even when assets are titled jointly and the couple states they
share, sharing might not be actually occurring. Although a partner
may have equal access to funds for personal spending, many factors,
including cultural patterns, can cause the nonearner partner to defer
to the spending preferences of the earner.55 In fact, studies suggest
that the earner partner controls the finances although the nonearner
may manage them.5 6 Thus, who pays the bills might not indicate who
has control; the manager may simply be implementing the controller's
plan. The difference between "control" and "management" is appre-
ciable but difficult to define.57
In order to capture all the complexity concerning financial re-
sources, any survey must be somewhat complicated. This complexity,
in turn, makes statistical analysis difficult.5 8 I suspect, however, that
well as investments, were held either jointly or by himself. Nevertheless, in the comment
section, he states: "to have and to hold-jointly." Random Study Questionnaire # 49.
55. As Pahl states, "RIhere were many ambiguities about the realities of shared man-
agement." PHi, supra note 52, at 83. One interviewer, for example, noted:
The joint interview gave the impression that they were a pooling couple, but in
the individual interview it became apparent that the wife never really handled
money, although she did legally have access because of the joint account. The
husband (the only earner) always went to the bank and wrote the cheques. The
wife saw child benefit [a British governmental support program] as her only really
independent source of income; she stated that she felt a difference between this
money, which she had autonomy over, and her husband's salary, which she had to
ask to use.
Id. at 84. As another example, in Amy Tan's The Joy Luck Club, one couple shares all
expenses except personal expenditures. The wife, Lena, in response to her mother's ques-
tion about what a list represents, says that the list is of items she and her husband share.
On the list is ice cream, something Lena has hated for years. Yet Lena has never told her
husband that. Although he has noticed she never eats it, he continues to buy it and it
remains a shared expense. AMY TAN, THE Joy LucK CLUB 176-77 (1989).
56. PAHL, supra note 52, at 49-56.
57. Id. at 79-83. In Pahl's study, responsibility for paying bills strongly correlated with
control over finances. Id.
58. For example, my first question asked for current marital status and my second
asked for current living arrangement. Answers to both these questions help make relevant
classifications for pooling analysis. They distinguish, for example, between a married per-
son living with someone and an unmarried person living with someone. A few respondents
were confused by these relatively simple questions. One respondent, for example, did not
know why I asked the second question and left it blank. Two others complained about
"complexity."
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respondents would answer inconsistently not because of confusion,
but simply because they themselves are inconsistent; they say one
thing and do another. For example, a respondent in my study would
state that the couple placed income in joint accounts, but in the next
question would respond that certain accounts were held separately.
Another respondent would state that wages were held in joint ac-
counts, but when asked how checking, saving, and money market ac-
counts were held, he would respond that all were in his name. The
fact that nominal or legal status does not always match the reality of
financial patterns further complicates analysis. Simple tabulation of
results gives tidy data, but not necessarily the truest picture.
In summary, the complexity of the issue and the difficulty in dis-
cerning the real situation (e.g., whether the joint account really is
joint) means that percentages in my study or any study of this nature
must be regarded cautiously. They should be taken not as absolutes,
but as indications of the relevant frequency of pooling and separate
maintenance of assets.
B. Data
I examined three studies of intra-family resource allocation as
well as my own. My study was an anonymous ninety-three question
survey that was distributed twice. First it was distributed in June 1991
to households randomly picked from a phone book that covered six
economically and racially diverse suburbs of Cleveland, Ohio (the
random study).5 9 The second distribution was in October 1991 and
went to all full- and part-time students at Cleveland-Marshall College
of Law, Cleveland State University (the CSU study). 60 Eighty-three
surveys were returned in the first survey and 179 in the second, result-
ing in a response rate of seventeen percent for both. The three prior
intra-family studies I examined were the vast study in the 1983 book
American Couples by Philip Blumstein and Pepper Schwartz, 61 a small
59. Responses to the Random study will be cited as "Random Study Questionnaire #
60. The results of this study, as well as the difficulties in conceiving, conducting, and
analyzing the data, are the subject of another article that is in progress. The respondents in
my CSU survey were more heterogeneous than one might initially expect. The school,
being a large urban school with a significant night division, has many older, fully-employed
students. In fact, 17 CSU respondents or their partners individually had income over
$100,000. Responses to the CSU study will be cited as "CSU Questionnaire # ."
61. AMERICAN COUPLES, supra note 45. A description of the survey method is in the
book's appendix. The authors' research was much publicized in the media. Id. at 17. In
response to this media coverage and to the public addresses given by the authors to various
groups, 22,000 38-page questionnaires were either mailed to people who requested them or
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1986 study of dual-career couples in the greater Chicago area by
Rosanna Hertz,62 and an English study of 102 married couples con-
ducted specifically on the issue of money and marriage by Jan Pah. 63
were picked up by people from public places where they had been left. Id. The authors
used 12,000 of these; each had been filled out by both parties in the couple. Additionally,
the authors intensively interviewed 300 couples: 120 were heterosexual (72 married and 48
cohabiting), 90 lesbian, and 90 gay male. Id. at 15-19.
Shere Hite also conducted a large, wide-ranging survey of American couples in 1980.
SrlERE HrIE, WOMEN Am LOVE: A CULTURAL REVOLUTION IN PROGRESS (1987). The
questionnaire, consisting of 127 essay questions, was distributed beginning in 1980 to clubs
and organizations in 34 states and counseling and walk-in centers for women and families
in 43 states. Id. at 777. Additionally, women who wrote and requested a copy were sent
one. Id. Of the 100,000 questionnaires distributed, 4,500 were returned. Id. "This is al-
most twice as high as the standard rate of return for this kind of questionnaire distribution,
which is estimated at 2.5 to 3 percent." Id. My rate of response at 17% compares quite
favorably to Hite's rate. Hite chose essay questions because of the difficulty of studying
emotions. Id. at 776. However, the difficulty of tabulating essays responses-despite
Hite's elaborate categorization system-makes her statistical analysis suspect. Although
exact percentages are questionable, the overall trends of sharing and nonsharing are not.
Moreover, the book provides insightful excerpts from respondents.
Question 41 of the questionnaire asked:
Do you share the money? Who controls the money? Do you both work outside
the home? Who pays the rent or mortgage? Buys the groceries? How do you
feel about the financial arrangements? Do they affect the relationship?
Id. at 791.
62. Rosanna Hertz interviewed 21 white, dual-career couples (42 interviews, average
length 2 1/2 hours) in the Chicago area. At least one spouse in each couple worked in a
large corporation; each individual was either an established professional or at least a mid-
level manager. The individuals were in their mid-thirties, had a median individual income
of $47,500 for males and $40,200 for females (joint income averaged $90,250), and had
been married an average of 9.0 years. ROSANNA HERTz, MoPa EQUAL THAN OTHERs:
WOMEN AND MEN N DUAL-CAREER MARRIAGES 23-25 (1986). Eleven couples (about
52%) maintained separate finances (each spouse contributed a fixed amount-either equal
or proportionate to income-towards basic expenses); 10 couples (about 48%) pooled
their money (money was viewed as jointly owned even if spouses had separate charge cards
or minimal personal allowances). Id. at 90-91. Whether the couple had children did not
seem to determine the choice of financial systems. Of those who pooled, three had no
children and eight had children. Of those who kept their finances separate, four had no
children and six had children. Id. at 91 n.3.
63. PAHL, supra note 52, at 186. The study involved 102 married couples and used
written questionnaires and oral interviews of both spouses living within 30 miles of each
other. See id. app. 1 (describing the research method). Of the 102 couples, half the women
and most of the men were gainfully employed. Id. at 63. The men made substantially more
than the women. For example, 34% of the women made less than £19 per week and 49%
made between £19 and £57; no men made less than £19 and only 6% made between £19
and £57 and some made as much as £300 per week. Only 2% of women made between £96
and £134; none made more. Seventy-two percent of the men made £96 or more. Id. at 65.
Only half the couples had savings (either jointly or individually) and these were modest
amounts. Only nine couples had joint savings greater than £1000. Id. at 63. Pahl has also
published an article based on this data on the control of money. Jan Pahl, Household
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Despite the many differences in the studies and their limitations, 64 all
the studies produce remarkably similar data. Couples do not univer-
sally share or pool finances, let alone universally believe in such a sys-
tem. In fact, a significant percentage (ranging from thirty percent to
approximately fifty percent) do not share all their income. In my ran-
dom study, only seventy percent of the married respondents who an-
swered the question, "Do you and your partner place money received
from wages and salaries into joint and/or separate accounts?" stated
that they placed such money solely in joint accounts. 65 In contrast, in
the CSU survey a mere 55.6 percent of respondents, married or un-
married, who lived with another in a long-term relationship kept all
wages jointly. Moreover, a sizeable minority of 27.2 percent kept all
wages separate.66 In Hertz's and Pahl's studies only approximately
Spending, Personal Spending and the Control of Money in Marriage, 24 Soc. 119 (1990)
[hereinafter Pahl, Control].
64. For example, Pahl's study was limited in its scope since it focused solely on money
and only within the context of marriage. Additionally, a study based on English couples
has obvious cultural limitations. The Hertz study relied on an extremely small sample,
examined only a very narrow slice of the population, and presented its data primarily in
anecdotal form without any tables. The American Couples study, as reported in the book,
discussed only whether couples believe in pooling resources, even though the raw data
underlying the study had more specifics on how they actually kept their money. The data
is available on computer tape through the Murray Institute at Radcliffe College. Due to
the data's age, I did not analyze it. Both American studies are based on old data: Hertz
did her research in 1981 and 1982, HERTZ, supra note 62, at 219, and American Couples is
based on data gathered from 1978 to 1981. AMERICAN COUPLES, supra note 45, at 549
n.12. My study is limited by its failure to obtain responses from both partners and by its
multiple-choice written format.
I performed the CSU study partly to offset any sampling problems I encountered in
my random survey. By using the whole population, I eliminated sampling errors. Obvi-
ously, the CSU study is open to the criticism that law students are not a representative
population. This criticism loses force in two respects. First, the CSU population is more
diverse than average given its urban location, its part-time division, and its historical mis-
sion to admit nontraditional students. Second, even if the CSU population does not repre-
sent the entire United States population, but merely a strata, the study provides evidence
as to that population's pooling practices. Data showing that a substantial portion of a
significant segment of society does not pool is by definition meaningful data.
65. Fourteen couples, or 20.9%, kept their money partially joint and partially sepa-
rate. Six couples, or 9.0%, kept such money entirely separate.
66. According to the CSU survey, 17.3% kept wages partially joint and partially sepa-
rate. Pahl states that a 1987 study by R. Jowell, S. Witherspoon and L. Brook, British
Social Attitudes: The 1987 Report (Social & Community Planning Research, London 1987)
reported that of 1086 couples, 15% stated they either kept their money separately or only
partially pooled. PAHL, supra note 52, at 106. However, for couples with income exceed-
ing $18,000, 25% kept their money in such a manner. Id. Nearly half of nonmarried co-
habiting couples handled their money this way. Id. In comparison, Blumstein and
Schwartz's figures showed that more than two-thirds of spouses believed in pooling, but
less than half of nonmarried cohabitors did. AMERICAN COUPLES, supra note 45, at 101;
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half stated they actually share.67 American Couples reported that over
two-thirds of spouses believed in pooling all property and financial as-
sets, whereas less than half of unmarried cohabitors so believed.68
My CSU survey statistics are consistent with Pahl's and Hertz's
statistics, while the results of my random survey among older, longer-
married couples are closer to those in American Couples. On the one
hand, my random survey results are consistent with the finding in
American Couples that the longer a couple had been together, the
more they favored pooling.69 On the other hand, the CSU survey of a
younger population more accurately reflects present and future
trends. Even if the group veers a little toward pooling as they age,
their varied lifestyles, including more dual careers, should increasingly
resemble the results of Hertz more than those in American Couples.70
My survey also shows that the method for handling finances can
vary over the course of a relationship. Some respondents stated that
see also infra note 69. While the book American Couples focused on attitudes and opin-
ions, the questionnaire did ask some specifics about financial matters such as: Do you and
your partner both have separate incomes from any source? Whose income... pays for the
following expenses? Do partners have joint or separate checking and savings accounts and
who contributes to them? Do partners discuss with each other the amount they should
have for personal spending? Whose money was used for investments and how are they
held? I& at 626-28.
67. HERTZ, supra note 62, at 91 (48%); PAHL, supra note 52, at 78 (56%). In Hite's
study, only 36% placed all money in a joint account. HrrE, supra note 61, at 445.
68. Sixty-nine percent of 3,637 wives and 75% of 3,642 husbands favored pooling,
19% and 17% respectively were neutral, and 12% and 8% respectively were opposed to
pooling. According to American Couples, full-time homemakers favored pooling (72%)
more than wives employed part-time (69%) or full-time (68%), and wives earning over
$30,000 favored pooling less than those who earned under $10,000 (61% versus 71%). Of
651 female cohabitors, 27% favored pooling, 29% were neutral, and 44% opposed it. Of
650 male cohabitors, 32% favored pooling, 31% were neutral, and 37% opposed it. AmER-
icAN COUPLES, supra note 45, at 101, fig. 9. In a recent newspaper article, Pepper Schwartz
is quoted as saying that about 80% of couples share money. Brenda Richardson, Family
Finance Options, THE TrMEs-PIcAYUNE (New Orleans), Apr. 11, 1993, at F-8. She gives no
details as to how she reached this figure, which is clearly greater than what the text of
American Couples suggests.
69. According to American Couples, the longer a couple had been together, the more
they favored pooling. But regardless of the duration of the arrangement, wives and female
cohabitors favored pooling less than husbands and male cohabitors. AmERICAN COUPLES,
supra note 45, fig. 8 at 95. Gay men favored pooling more than males involved in hetero-
sexual cohabitation but less than husbands. For men in a relationship of two to 10 years,
74% percent of husbands, 32% of male cohabitors, and 44% of gay men in couples favored
pooling. I& For those women in a relationship two to 10 years, 66% of wives, 27% of
female cohabitors, and 40% of lesbians favored pooling. Id.
70. Hertz noted that some of the couples who had separate finances began sharing
during their marriages. She concluded that although arguments about money led to the
switch, "in each case the wife's career and increasing income were the real catalysts behind
the change." HERTZ, supra note 62, at 95.
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while finances were kept separately in the early years of their relation-
ship, they were held jointly later.71 Others stated that finances were
separate while both worked, joint while one was a student, and would
become separate once again when the student returned to work.72
Change from single to married status could also shift financial pat-
terns from separate to joint.73 As part of my interviewing while devel-
oping the questionnaire, but not in the survey, I learned that the birth
of children can also cause a switch from separate to joint finances.
Closely connected to the issue of sharing or pooling income is the
question of control; in other words, who decides how the money
should be spent? If one person dominates the decision-making pro-
cess, true sharing cannot exist. The term "sharing" covers various dis-
parate situations. Bob Breadearner "shares" his income with his
spouse Betty, but he decides how that money is spent. In contrast, Sid
Sharingsworth likewise earns all the family income, but decisions are
jointly made with his wife Sharon. The "reality" of Sharon's portion
of the income is probably very different from Betty's.
Empirical evidence suggests that even among couples who nomi-
nally pool assets, such as Sid and Sharon, true sharing frequently does
not occur because power arising from both cultural sources and earn-
ing power is distributed unequally. Eighty-seven percent of Shere
Hite's respondents felt uncomfortable being financially dependent on
their partner and made such comments as, "I felt guilty asking for any
money and I wouldn't ask unless it was for groceries" 74 or "I was fi-
nancially dependent on a man I was married to. I felt guilty spending
his money. '75 Hite states that "[e]ven if a woman is comfortable be-
ing financially dependent on a man, still there may be insidious psy-
chological effects" such as feelings of inferiority.76 If a woman feels
inferior, is she going to act as if she shares equally in the financial
assets and spend them as freely as the earner spouse? According to
Hite's study, eighty-two percent of women under twenty-five want to
be financially independent.77
71. CSU Questionnaire ## 45, 61, 71, 73, 77, 108, 115, and 168. Respondents gave a
variety of reasons such as convenience, growing trust in each other, or going back to
school.
72. CSU Questionnaire ## 37, 56, and 135.
73. CSU Questionnaire ## 46 and 122.
74. HrrE, supra note 61, at 432.
75. Id. at 433.
76. Id. at 435.
77. Id. at 438. My study could not explore this issue well due to its multiple choice
format. However, several respondents stressed the need for independence in the optional
comment section. Perhaps the most striking comment came from a woman in my random
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American Couples found that among married couples, heterosex-
ual unmarried couples, and gay couples, the amount of money one
partner earned relative to the other determined relative power and
control over resources. 78 Among married couples, the higher the
wife's income, the more financial autonomy she had, and the more
likely she was to have her own personal savings account. This result
was even more pronounced among unmarried couples.79
sample who had been married 47 years. She wrote: "I had no financial power in the rela-
tionship until I worked, or inherited. I learned to keep some of what I had for indepen-
dence, if I was to ever have any. Husbands are not interested in giving wives financial
independence." Random Study Questionnaire #14.
78. Only in lesbian relationships did income not affect power. This shows the effect
of culture on control. AMERICAN COUPLEs, supra note 45, at 53. The evidence that con-
trol follows earning power has been suggested by other studies. See, e.g., PAm, supra note
52, at 47-57. Pahl states that the "historical evidence suggested that the higher the house-
hold income, the more likely it was that overall control would be in the hands of the hus-
band .... The historical evidence also suggested that when wives earned in their own
right, or when they were the producers of goods for sale, such as eggs and butter, wool and
cloth, then they were likely to have more say in financial management." Id. at 47. But
note that management is different from control. See id. at 83-84, for Pahl's discussion of
the difference.
79. AMERICAN COUPLES, supra note 45, at 53. Blumstein and Schwartz base their
conclusions as to autonomy on the responses to their question, "Do you talk with your
partner about how much money ... you should have for personal spending?" Id. at 628.
Fifty-six percent of wives earning less than $10,000 (N = 2,241) did not discuss this issue
with their spouses; 61% earning between $10,000 and $30,000 (N = 1,209); and 78% of
those with incomes greater than $30,000 (N = 96). Id. at 554 n.2. Female partners in heter-
osexual nonmarried couples, like gay men, placed a greater emphasis on independence:
Sixty-seven percent of female cohabitors who earn less than $10,000 (N = 311) do
not discuss with their partners how much they should have for personal spending
money, as compared to 75 percent of women with income between $10,000 and
$30,000 (N = 314) and 94 percent of those earning more than $30,000 (N = 16).
Id. at 555 n. 13. In both groups, the higher the income, the more likely the female was to
have an individual savings account. The responses to the question, "Do you have a savings
account in your name only?" were as follows:
Family
Income Wives Cohabitors
< $10,000 33% (N = 2,251) 69% (N = 309)
$10,000-$30,000 40% (N = 1,206) 86% (N = 316)
> $30,000 57% (N = 96) 100% (N = 16)
I. at 554 n.3 & 555 n.13.
Notice that the percentage of married women at every income level who claim they do
not discuss personal spending decisions with their spouses exceeds the percentage of those
who have their own savings account. Does the fact that they are using a joint account (or
money provided by their husbands) subtly affect their personal spending decisions so that
these decisions are not as independent as the wives say? In contrast, the percentage of
nonmarried female cohabitors with individual savings accounts exceeds the percentage
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The authors concluded that the financial choices all couples face
usually revolve around demands for equality and autonomy, or the
sacrifice of one or both to achieve intimacy, trust, and interdepen-
dence. These last are critical for creating commitment, but may in-
terfere with the individual rights of the partners. In traditional
marriage, interdependence is usually achieved at the cost of the
wife's autonomy and her participation on an equal basis in decision
making.
80
Despite the presence of joint accounts and a belief in resource
sharing, control of the money generally still resides with the earner.81
Moreover, this psychological ownership of money created in the
earner spouse could interact with cultural roles to increase that
spouse's control of money.8 2 The more money a wife earns the more
likely she is to control money in a joint account.8 3 Frequently, a
change in earning power is reflected by a change in the system of fi-
nances. However, a strong ideological belief in shared finances based
on a commitment to partnership, or in separate finances based on au-
tonomy, can override such a change.84
One researcher, Carole Burgoyne, found that
all the non-earning women whose husbands controlled the pool,
said that if and when they started earning they would keep their
money separately .... This suggests that despite an overt ideology
of shared income, these women may have felt the need for a greater
who claim not to discuss personal spending decisions with partners. These figures demon-
strate the difficulty in interpreting data. Independently held assets may not be as in-
dependent as legal title suggests. Likewise, statements and behavior may not always
coincide.
80. Id. at 109.
81. E.g., Carole B. Burgoyne, Money in Marriage: How Patterns of Allocation Both
Reflect and Conceal Power, 38 Soc. REv. 634, 639 (1990) (studying 13 middle-aged, middle-
class English women and nine of their partners).
82. See id. at 635 (citing M. Edwards, Financial Arrangements Within Families, Soc.
SECURITY J. 1, 1 (Dec. 1981)); see also Pahl, Control, supra note 63, at 124 (noting social
class also affects control of money, particularly in couples with joint accounts, and that
when one spouse is middle class and the other working class, the middle class spouse con-
trolled the money). "Wife control of finances was particularly common in low income,
working class households... [whereas] ... husband control was associated with relatively
high income levels." Id. at 123. Husband control was typical when he was the main or sole
earner. Id. When there was a joint account, the more the woman earned, the more likely
she was to control the money. Id.
Hite reports that 91% of the women in her study responded that they balanced the
books and were responsible for paying bills. HrrE, supra note 61, at 442, 869. Neverthe-
less, a large number of women reported feeling guilty spending money they had not earned
themselves, even if it was to purchase necessities. Even a small amount of independent
resources relieved this guilt. Id. at 433, 436.
83. Pahl, Control, supra note 63, at 124.
84. Burgoyne, supra note 81, at 645-46.
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element of control, and perhaps the opportunity to have some
money for themselves. This must also cast doubt on the psychologi-
cal reality of sharing in these households.
85
When married women contribute significantly to the joint income, the
couples frequently keep earnings separate.8 6 Hertz concludes that, by
itself, the mere fact women earn independent incomes does not lead
to separate finances. Rather, "a correlation seems to exist between
the type of accounting system.., and the authority relations within
their marriages. In general, those couples who have chosen separate
accounting systems have made a step toward altering the traditional
balance of marital authority."87
The evidence from empirical studies indicates that neither asser-
tions of pooling nor nominal arrangement of assets in a pooling man-
ner accurately reflect the reality of financial arrangements. Behind
the facade of sharing is a deep-seated, though often subtle, control of
the income by the earner spouse. This control springs both from the
individual's feelings of psychological ownership of earnings and from
cultural stereotypes of gender and marital roles. Perhaps in recogni-
tion of this reality, as women increase their earnings, women will in-
creasingly keep their money separately. As one woman in my CSU
survey stated, separate finances are necessary for the stability and lon-
gevity of the relationship.88 Such a reality contradicts the premise of a
joint income tax liability.
Unmarried couples are wary of dependence and pooling; they
know relationships frequently do not last. As the divorce rate rises,
89
married couples too have been made aware of this fact. Thus, some
commentators believe that the separate financial arrangements of un-
married couples will also become common among married couples.90
85. Id. at 649.
86. Id. at 650 (reporting that the three women who contributed significantly kept their
money separately). In Hertz's study of mid-level dual-earner couples, approximately 52%
kept their finances separate. HERTZ, supra note 62, at 90.
87. Id. at 112.
88. CSU Questionnaire # 117. One male respondent commented that when both re-
spondents produce income, it is "natural" not to share all. CSU Questionnaire # 31.
89. STAT. ABsTRAcr, supra note 12, at tbl. 127.
90. AMERIcAN CoUPLEs, supra note 45, at 109.
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11M. A Short History of the Taxable Unit Theory and
Practice
A. Theory
Our income tax is premised on the principle that the burdens of
tax ought to be distributed according to relative ability to pay.91 Abil-
ity to pay is best determined by looking at income. Under the classic
Haig-Simons definition, income is the sum of consumption plus the
increase in net worth (i.e., accumulation) between two points in
time.92 This definition does not make any judgment as to the appro-
priate taxable unit for determining ability to pay, and according to
Professor Boris Bittker, it cannot. In an area "so entangled with so-
cial and psychological issues of a non-tax character, it is absurd to
think that an economist's definition can provide a uniquely 'correct'
solution." 93 Theorists do not agree as to the appropriate taxable unit
and throughout our income tax history the law has taken various posi-
tions.94 There are several possibilities from which to choose. Most
91. WILLIAM A. KLEIN & JOSEPH BANKMAN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 16-17 (9th
ed. 1993).
92. According to the Haig-Simons definition, "Personal income may be defined as the
algebraic sum of (1) the market value of rights exercised in consumption and (2) the
change in the value of the store of property rights between the beginning and end of the
period in question." HENRY C. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION 50 (1938). Haig
defined income as "the increase or accretion in one's power to satisfy his wants in a given
period in so far as that power consists of (a) money itself, or, (b) anything susceptible of
valuation in terms of money." Robert Haig, The Concept of Income-Economic and Legal
Aspects, in THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 7 (Robert Haig ed., 1921). Of course, in practice
this definition is modified. Most notable, perhaps, is the requirement that some event be-
yond the mere accretion of income occurs before tax liability attaches; in tax parlance that
event is realization. See Cottage Savings Ass'n v. Comm'r, 499 U.S. 554, 601 (1991); Eisner
v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 208 (1920).
93. Boris I. Bittker, Federal Income Taxation and the Family, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1389,
1421 (1975). McIntyre and Oldman, in contrast, believe that the Haig-Simons definition
can play a role in the choice of taxable unit, and that the rule "most in harmony with the
Haig-Simons definition is that each family member should be taxed on the items he actu-
ally consumes or accumulates, regardless of source." Michael J. McIntyre & Oliver Old-
man, Taxation of the Family in Comprehensive and Simplified Income Tax, 90 HARV. L.
REV. 1573, 1576 (1977). They actually favor income splitting. Id. at 1578-79. Simons, how-
ever, seemed to vacillate on this point. SIMONS, supra note 92, at 136-42.
94. A variety of articles, books, and conferences have examined the issue of the ap-
propriate tax unit. See, e.g., HAROLD GROVES, FEDERAL TAX TREATMENT OF THE FAM-
ILY 4 (1963); Boris I. Bittker, supra note 93, at 1398; Pamela B. Gann, Abandoning Marital
Status as a Factor in Allocating Income Tax Burdens, 59 TEx. L. REV. 1, 5-10 (1980) [here-
inafter Gann, Marital Status]; Pamela B. Gann, The Earned Income Deduction: Congress's
1981 Response to the "Marriage Penalty" Tax, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 421, 468 (1983); Philip
J. Harmelink, Marital Status Tax Discrimination After Tax Reform: Proposals to Resolve
the Penalty/Bonus Issues, 26 WILLIAMETTE L. REV. 593, 594 (1990); Carolyn Jones, Split
Income and Separate Spheres: Tax Law and Gender Roles in the 1940s, 6 LAW & HIST.
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broadly, the issue is whether tax liability should be determined on the
basis of each individual or on the basis of each economic unit. In the
context of the personal income tax, the economic unit itself may be
variously defined as the marital unit (husband and wife), the nuclear
family (husband, wife, and minor children), extended family (certain
individuals related by blood, marriage, or adoption), or the household
family (all individuals sharing the same living quarters). 95
Different theories underlie the two basic types of taxable units. If
the tax unit is the individual, then tax-paying ability is based solely on
each individual's earnings and on income produced by property titled
in her name. This position holds that only individuals, not groups,
have tax-paying capacity. The contrasting theory holds that the family
is the taxable unit since the family, not the individual, is the basic eco-
REv. 259, 262 (1988); Edward J. McCaffery, Taxation and the Family: A Fresh Look at
Behavioral Gender Biases in the Code, 40 UCLA L. REV. 983, 985 (1993); McIntyre &
Oldman, supra note 93; Douglas Thorson, An Analysis of the Sources of Continued Contro-
versy Over the Tax Treatment Of Family Income, 18 NAT'L TAX J. 113, 113 (1965); Laura
Ann Davis, Note, A Feminist Justification for the Adoption of an Individual Filing System,
62 S. CAL. L. REV. 197 (1988).
For a good early history of the joint return as a taxable unit as well as a discussion of
the joint tax liability that arises from joint returns and the resulting "innocent spouse"
problem, see Richard Beck, The Innocent Spouse Problem: Joint and Several Liability for
Income Taxes Should Be Repealed, 43 VAND. L. REv. 297, 317 (1990). Cf. Dulude, supra
note 48, at 67.
Until recently, most theorists supported the family as the taxable unit. See Bittker,
supra note 93, at 1395. Lay opinion agreed. GROVES, supra, at 69. Today, although con-
troversy still exists, growing numbers of commentators support a "marriage neutral" sys-
tem under which marital status would not affect the amount of tax liability. Under this
system the taxable unit would be the individual, possibly with some adjustments for depen-
dents. See, e.g., Gann, Marital Status, supra; Harmelink, supra; McCaffery, supra; Davis,
supra, at 218. Some of these commentators, such as Davis, justify on feminist grounds their
conclusions that the current joint system is unfair to women because it supports traditional
patriarchal family structures. See Davis, supra, at 233 nn.197-202; see also id. at 214 (dis-
cussing protectionist attitudes concerning women's dependence on men).
95. In keeping with most theorists who do not differentiate among the types of eco-
nomic units, I shall use "family unit" to refer generally to all types of group economic units,
in contrast to the individual tax units.
Other ways of dealing with the tax unit issue is to tax individuals but permit deduc-
tions for dependents, or to tax individuals with dependents at different rates, as in head-of-
household rates in § 1 (b) of the Internal Revenue Code. I.R.C. § 1 (b) (West 1993). This
Article does not deal with these aspects of the problem.
"Tax unit" can refer to several things: the assessment unit, the filing unit, or the tax-
paying unit. These various aspects of the concept need not be defined identically, and in
actual legislation, have not been. Thorson, supra note 94, at 114.
As Professor Deborah Geier pointed out to me in conversation, the issue of the
proper taxable unit for entities is also in flux with the reexamination of issues such as
intercorporate dividends. The issue of integration of the corporate tax with the personal
income tax is a major taxable unit question.
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nomic unit within which financial resources are shared, regardless of
the source of the wage or investment income.
96
The family or economic group unit theory ignores actual legal ti-
tle and rights to property, whereas the theory of the individual as the
taxable unit respects them. Thus, if the family is the relevant taxable
unit, horizontal equity occurs when two families with identical total
income, regardless of how the income is earned or distributed within
the family, are taxed equally. If the individual is the proper tax unit,
horizontal equity is achieved when two individuals with equal income
are taxed equally regardless of their marital status. A tax system that
achieves horizontal equity between families will create inequities be-
tween families and individuals with similar incomes if the system is
progressive. The nature of the inequities will depend upon the sched-
ule of tax rates for individuals and families. Some schedules will favor
married couples, thus imposing a "singles" tax, while other schedules
might create a "marriage" penalty, taxing married couples
disproportionately.
Consider, for example, three couples each with no children.
Mary and Mike, a married couple, who have $60,000 of income earned
all by Mike; Betty and Bob, also a married couple, who have $60,000
of income with $30,000 earned by each, and Sid and Sally, an unmar-
ried couple who live together, and also have a total income of $60,000,
all earned by Sally. Assume that (1) the tax system determines tax
liability based on each economic unit; (2) only a married couple is
defined as an economic unit; (3) economic units consisting of more
than one member must use the split-income97 approach, and (4) the
96. Fullerton and Rogers, for example, state that using household income, as our tax
system does,
makes good sense, since the well-being of an individual depends not simply on his
or her own income wealth, but rather on the income or wealth of the entire
household .... In the lifetime perspective, however, it becomes extremely diffi-
cult to think about the "lifetime" of a household. Household composition varies
tremendously over an individual's lifetime due to marriage, births, divorce, deaths
and the moving out of adult children.
Don Fullerton & Diane Lim Rogers, Lifetime Verses Annual Perspectives on Tax Incidence,
44 NAT'L TAX J. 277, 280 (1991). They therefore use the individual, not the household
unit, to look at lifetime income. Their statement that the income tax system uses house-
hold income is, however, not entirely accurate; the system uses household income for only
certain types of households (married couples, heads of households).
97. There are three basic approaches to determining the tax on the unit. The unit
approach taxes each unit at the same marginal rate. All income of every member of the
tax unit is aggregated, and then a common marginal rate is applied. Thus, a married couple
in which the husband and wife each earn $30,000 will pay the same amount of tax as a
single person earning $60,000. The "kiddie tax" under § 1(g) is an example of the unit
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tax rate is ten percent on the first $30,000 of income and twenty per-
cent on the next $30,000. Since a married couple is one taxable unit,
Mike and Mary, and Betty and Bob can effectively split their income.
Thus each of their total tax liabilities would be $6,000. In contrast, Sid
and Sally's total tax liability would be $9,000, or fifty percent more
than the married couples who had the identical amount of income.98
The above example illustrates tax equality between similarly situ-
ated economic units when the economic unit is defined by marital sta-
tus. Mary and Mike, and Betty and Bob are each one unit but Sally
and Sid are two separate units. Thus, the tax system is tax-neutral
based on the assumption that married couples, and only married
couples, are an economic unit within which the members share finan-
cial resources and individual legal rights to property are irrelevant.
The system is not marriage-neutral, however, since the difference in
tax liability among the couples is based solely on marital status. If Sid
and Sally were to alter nothing but their marital status, their tax liabil-
ity would change. Moreover, the system clearly creates inequities be-
tween similarly situated individuals (ignoring their marital status).
Take for example Larry, an individual living alone with $60,000 in in-
come. Larry will pay $9,000 in taxes, fifty percent more than Mike's
share of tax liability for the $60,000 he earned.
approach. Under this section, the unearned income of children under age 14 is taxed at the
parents' marginal rate. I.R.C. § 1(g) (West 1993).
The per capita approach reduces the marginal rate of the married couple so that it
equals the rate of a single person with one-half the income of the married couple. All the
income of all the members of the tax unit is aggregated and that total is then divided by the
number of people in the unit, each of whom is then taxed individually at a marginal rate
that is applied to all individuals, regardless of whether they are individuals or part of a
greater taxable unit. This can be accomplished by either of two methods: splitting the
income of the married couple and then using the same marginal rates for the married
couple, or doubling the tax brackets for the married couple.
The third approach, the modified per capita method, yields results in between the two
other methods by instituting different rate schedules for different types of taxable units, or
by phasing out the per capita method at higher levels of income, or both. See, e.g., Thor-
son, supra note 94, at 118-23.
98. Under a unit approach, each unit would pay tax at the same marginal rate on the
same income of $60,000. Thus each marital unit earning $60,000 would pay $9,000 in taxes,
as would Sally. Under this approach, Bob and Betty are paying a "marriage penalty" and
would be better off if they were single. If single, each would be a sole taxable unit and the
tax liability of each would be $3,000, for a total of $6,000. A modified per capita approach
would modify the pure per capita approach of the split income example by, for example,
phasing out the rate differential as the marital unit's income increased. See also infra note
143.
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The justifications for treating the marital unit as the appropriate
tax unit are economic unity, marital obligations, and economies of
scale.99
(1) Economic Unity
The first and most important justification is economic unity. Tra-
ditionally, society views a marriage as an economic unit in which the
members share the economic resources. As the Canadian Royal
Commission on Taxation stated:
We believe firmly that the family is today, as it has been for many
centuries, the basic economic unit in society. Although few mar-
riages are entered into for purely financial reasons, as soon as a
marriage is contracted it is the continued income and financial posi-
tion of the family which is ordinarily of primary concern, not the
income and financial position of the individual members. Thus, the
married couple itself adopts the economic concept of the family as
the income unit from the outset. 1°°
There are several criticisms of this justification. First, people other
than married couples pool income. This criticism accepts the eco-
nomic unit theory, but holds that the marital unit is only one type of
economic unit. To single it out for special tax treatment is unjust. A
fairer approach would be to treat all households or families as eco-
nomic units, although such an approach has its own problems, such as
defining "household" and "family." 10'
Second, some critics attack the underlying assumption of pooling
that couples always share income. For example, taxpayers ignore
many opportunities to lower their taxes by means of intra-family gifts,
not simply because of ignorance or inertia, but possibly because they
attach significance to legal title. 0 2
Third, the women's rights movement undermines the pooling jus-
tification by emphasizing women's increasing access to economic inde-
pendence as yet another indication that title is significant. 0 3 More
99. Bittker, supra note 93, at 1420-25 (listing some of these justifications).
100. REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON TAXATION (1966) (quoted in Bittker,
supra note 93, at 1393).
101. See supra Part I.A.
102. Bittker, supra note 93, at 1394. The significance attached to legal title seems to be
particularly true at upper income levels. Thorson, supra note 94, at 116.
103. Bittker, supra note 93, at 1394. Thorson states that historically, coordinating the
tax unit with the legal property unit was of great importance. For example, the family was
the tax unit under the Civil War income tax statutes, because under property law, the
husband substantially owned both his wife's and children's income. Thorson, supra note 94,
at 115. By the time the income tax was instituted under the Sixteenth Amendment in 1913,
married women's property rights had been established, which necessitated considering the
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importantly, feminist theory undercuts the very premise that the fam-
ily is an economic unit. The economic unit theory assumes that the
family is a monolithic, homogeneous group in which all members
share the same tastes and resources, including income, equally. Under
this "benign patriarch" theory of the family, the male "head of house-
hold" traditionally speaks and acts for the unit.1' 4 True pooling
presumes equality, if not in contribution to the pool, then at least in
free access to the pool. Although partners are moving toward more
equal arrangements, disparities still exist.10 5
Finally, the pooling rationale is criticized because it focuses on
income consumption, which is more appropriate for a consumption-
based tax than an income tax that measures accessions to wealth.
0 6
Our income tax traditionally attributes income to the taxpayer who
controls it even if no benefit is obtained through her own personal
enjoyment or use of the income. For example, under section 674 of
the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) a taxpayer is still considered the
owner of property placed in an irrevocable trust for the benefit of
others because the taxpayer can affect the beneficial enjoyment of
that property. 07 Similarly, a taxpayer who gives away the income
from property that he owns is still taxed on that income, on the theory
that control of the underlying property is, in effect, control of the in-
individual as the taxable unit. The "deep commitment" to this approach is evident in the
Supreme Court's 1930 rulings in Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930), and Poe v. Seaborn,
282 U.S. 101 (1930). In Poe, the Court held that spouses in community property states
could each file separately with respect to one-half of the community property income de-
spite the fact that it was all earned by one spouse. 282 U.S. at 118. In contrast, Lucas
precluded spouses in common-law states from splitting their income despite a legally bind-
ing contract requiring the earner spouse to transfer one-half of his income to his wife. 281
U.S. at 114-15. The contract had been entered into without any tax evasion intent (because
the contract was executed prior to the institution of the income tax). Id. at 113-14; see also
Jones, supra note 94, at 262 (discussing how gender roles influenced the 1948 enactment of
the joint return).
104. Patricia F. Apps & Ray Rees, Taxation and the Household, 35 J. PuB. ECON. 355,
355 (1988) (referring to GARY BECKER, A TREATISE ON THE FAMILY (1991 enlarged ed.)).
Needless to say, this view of the family has not gone unchallenged. A few recent articles
which have addressed the joint tax return as an example of patriarchal benevolence are
McCaffery, supra note 94; Nelson, supra note 48; and Davis, supra note 94. See also supra
note 44 and accompanying text.
Susan Moller Okin states that power within the family is ignored either because it is
seen as "natural" or that it is exercised altruistically. SusAN MOLLER OKIN, JUSTICE, GEN-
DER AND THE FAMmLY 128 (1989).
105. See supra Part II.
106. Gann, Marital Status, supra note 94, at 25.
107. I.R.C. § 674 (West 1993).
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come.108 Property control, in fact, presently governs community prop-
erty income for certain purposes of the current Code, such as self-
employment income and income of nonresident aliens. 0 9
(2) Marital Obligations
Another justification for treating a married couple as a taxable
unit is that marriage alters an individual's rights and obligations,
thereby justifying treating a married couple as one taxable unit. Crit-
ics note, however, that individuals other than spouses have a legal ob-
ligation of support, and question why these people are treated
differently than spouses. 10 Moreover, spousal support obligations
108. See, e.g., Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940). In Helvering, the Court held
that the taxpayer could be taxed on income from transferred coupons when the taxpayer
retained the bonds: "The power to dispose of income is the equivalent of ownership of it.
The exercise of that power to procure the payment of income to another is the enjoyment,
and hence the realization, of the income by him who exercises it." Id. at 118.
109. See I.R.C. § 1402(a)(5)(A) (West 1993) (including in the husband's self-employ-
ment income all income derived from a trade or business, which is community income
unless "the wife exercises substantially all of the management and control of such trade or
business"); I.R.C. § 879(a)(1) (West 1993) (treating earned income as income of the spouse
who earned it where one individual of a couple is a nonresident alien who has community
income).
The 1921 Revenue Bill proposed to clarify the treatment of community income by
attributing community income to the spouse who had management and control over it.
See, e.g., 61 CONG. REc. 5292-93 & 5811 (1921).
110. In fact, having a head-of-household rate schedule has made some allowance for
this argument. This schedule was enacted in 1951. However, to qualify for this schedule,
an unmarried person must maintain his home as the principal place of residence for depen-
dents. The given definition of dependents precludes some people who live together and
share social and emotional bonds from qualifying for either the joint or head-of-household
schedules.
Gary S. Becker has been the leading proponent of extending economic analysis into
the family area. His intent, as stated in the preface to the new edition of his seminal A
Treatise on the Family, is
to analyze marriage, births, divorce, division of labor in households ... and other
nonmaterial behavior with the tools and framework developed for material be-
havior. That is to say, this book contains an economic approach to the family, not
in the sense of an emphasis on the material aspects of family life, but in the sense
of a particular theoretical framework for analyzing many aspects of family life.
BECKER, supra note 104, at ix.
According to this economic view, there is indeed a marriage market, and decisions
such as whether to have children and, if so, how many, have economic components. Ac-
cord Lloyd Cohen, Marriage, Divorce, and Quasi Rents; or, "I Gave Him the Best Years of
My Life", 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 267, 267 (1987). But cf., e.g., Allan Carlson, A Pro-Family
Income Tax, 94 PUB. INTEREST 69, 74-75 (1989) (arguing that attempts to compensate for
imputed income for self-performed child care would result in "an odd tax structure");
Younger, supra note 43, at 891 (asserting that couples should marry "for benefit of minor
children" and not for economic convenience).
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can be viewed as voluntary decisions that should be treated no differ-
ently than other voluntary decisions to consume. The rejoinder is that
the decision to marry differs greatly from other decisions, such as
whether to take a trip or eat a peach.
(3) Economies of Scale
A final justification for treating the married couple as a taxable
unit is that economies of scale that result from living together need to
be taken into account. It is not, however, exactly clear how to evalu-
ate the economies of scale111 in determining ability to pay and, hence,
tax liability. Again, the critics reply that people other than two mar-
ried people live together and share resources. It is inequitable to treat
them differently. Moreover, economies of scale are too varied and
difficult to measure.1 2
111. Arguably, two married people should pay less tax than one single person with the
same amount of income. However, two single persons living separately whose combined
income equals that of two married persons should pay less than the married couple due to
economies of scale; even if two cannot live as cheaply as one, there is a benefit to sharing.
For example, a married couple only needs one kitchen, not two. But how much more
cheaply they can live is unclear, and therefore so is the "proper" rate differential between
single and married. Bittker states, for example, that if
a one-person household can maintain the same standard of living as a two-person
household for 75 percent of the latter's cost,... it is customarily argued that the
taxpaying capacities of the two units bear the same relationship and that their tax
liabilities should be fixed accordingly. On these assumptions, a single person with
$3,000 of income should pay the same tax as a married couple with $4,000 of
income ....
Bittker, supra note 93, at 1424 (citation omitted).
Additionally, a married couple often has the advantage of all the household services
provided by a nonworking spouse, the values of which are tax-free since our system does
not tax imputed income. See, e.g., Joseph A. Pechman, Income Splitting, 1 TAx REVISION
COMPENDIUM 473, 479-80 (1959); Bittker, supra note 93, at 1425-26.
Professors Oldman and Temple laid out the following equitable principles, based on
economies of scale:
1. An unmarried person should pay the same or a greater tax than a one-worker
married couple with equal income.
2. A one-worker married couple should pay a greater tax than a two-worker
married couple with equal income.
3. A two-worker couple should pay more than two single persons with the same
total income.
Oliver Oldman & Ralph Temple, Comparative Analysis of the Taxation of Married Persons,
12 STAN. L. REV. 585, 603-04 (1960).
112. See, e.g., Gann, Marital Status, supra note 94, at 29.
November 1993] LOVE, MONEY, AND THE IRS
B. The Dilemma of the Current Situation
Today a taxpayer's marital status affects her tax liability in a vari-
ety of ways;"13 the rate schedule is merely the most noticeable. For
example, taxability of transfers from one member to another n1 4 and
fringe benefits1 5 can hinge on marital status. These various provi-
sions are inconsistent in how they treat a married couple. Sometimes
the couple is treated simply as one unit so that it gets the same treat-
ment as an individual. For instance, the capital loss limitation of IRC
section 1211 is $3,000 for both a couple and for an individual. 1 6
Sometimes the couple is treated as a unit but each member is treated
as an individual. In these instances, the couple as a whole gets double
the deduction or credit, such as in IRC section 1244's ordinary loss
provision for small business stock." 7 At other times the unit is totally
ignored, as in the imposition of social security taxes.""
Not only is the marital unit treated inconsistently throughout the
tax code, but even the conceptual definition of the taxable unit fluctu-
ates. The taxable unit is either the individual, the married couple, or
113. See Harmelink, supra note 94, at 603-15, for a discussion of the various treat-
ments. His list is extensive, but not comprehensive. For example, he omits § 1361(c)(1),
which treats a husband and wife as one shareholder for purposes of determining the
number of shareholders of an S-corporation, I.R.C. § 1361(c)(1) (West 1993), and § 68,
which phases out itemized deductions when adjusted gross income exceeds the "applicable
amount" ($108,458 for 1993) and which is identical for single persons and married persons
filing jointly, I.R.C. § 68 (West 1993).
114. Section 1041 states that no gain or loss shall be recognized on a transfer of prop-
erty to a spouse or to a former spouse if the transfer is incident to a divorce. I.R.C.
§ 1041(a) (West 1993).
115. In a private letter ruling, an employer expanded health care benefits to include
nonspouse cohabitants of employees. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 90-34-048 (May 29, 1990). The issue
was whether the benefits provided to a nonspouse cohabitant could be excluded from gross
income, as are benefits provided to an employee's spouse. Id. at 1. The Treasury based its
ruling primarily on § 1.106-1 of the Treasury Regulations. Section 106 excludes employer-
provided health insurance from an employee's gross income. I.R.C. § 106 (West 1993).
Section 1.106-1 states that the employee does not have gross income if the employer con-
tributes to a health plan for the employee, the employee's spouse, or dependents, as de-
fined in § 152. Treas. Reg. § 1.106-1 (1956). Thus, if the cohabitant is not married to the
employee she does not qualify as a spouse, unless it is a common-law marriage recognized
by the state. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 90-34-048 at 4. Moreover, under § 152(b)(5), even if the em-
ployee supports the cohabitant, the cohabitant cannot qualify as a dependent of the em-
ployee if their living together violates local law. Id. at 5. Thus, the employee would have
gross income based on the employer's provision of health care for the cohabitant. Id. at 8.
The ruling states that the amount of the gross income is not the cost to the employer of the
insurance, but the fair market value it would have in an arm's length transaction. Id. at 9.
116. I.R.C. § 1211 (West 1993).
117. I.R.C. § 1244 (West 1993).
118. I.R.C. § 1301 (West 1993). Social security benefits, however, can be based on the
spouse's earnings.
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the head of household. The common underlying principle is that each
is an economic unit within which income is shared. Yet the tests are
not only inconsistent, but also inaccurate measures of whether there is
in fact pooling. Unlike marital status, head-of-household status re-
quires that the taxpayer and the other members of the taxable unit
live together for more than half of the year, presumably to ensure that
the group regards itself as a unit. The members of a married couple,
in contrast, can live on opposite coasts, keep two separate abodes, and
still file jointly.119 Married status automatically assumes that each
spouse pools income, but the reality might be completely separate fi-
nances. In contrast, to qualify as a head of household, a taxpayer
must meet specific economic tests by providing more than half the
support of the dependent living in her home.120 While married people
qualify simply by meeting the state requirements of marriage, heads of
households must live with people who are related by law (stepchil-
dren) or related by certain blood relationships (parent, child, or de-
scendant of child).
Another overriding inconsistency is the treatment of the income
of the other individuals within the unit. If the proper taxable entity is
the economic unit, the income of all dependents should be aggregated
with that of the parents (or head of household). However, under
I.R.C. section 1(g), our system currently aggregates only the unearned
income of children under fourteen. 12' All other members of the
household, including those under fourteen who have an earned in-
come, are treated as separate taxable units. This rule is directly con-
trary to the assumption that households pool their income.
Not only is our present treatment of the taxable unit inconsistent
and inaccurate, but it is based on outdated, unexamined premises. In
1948, when the joint return was established, certain assumptions
prompted creation of the joint return as a response to perceived inad-
equacies in the system.' 22 First was the assumption that spouses
119. Certain married people living separately can choose to be treated as not married
under §§ 7703(b) and 2(c). See I.R.C. §§ 2(c), 7703(b) (West 1993).
120. I.R.C. §§ 2(b), 152(a) (West 1993).
121. I.R.C. § 1(g) (West 1993).
122. See H.R. 1274, 80th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1948), reprinted in 1948-1 C.B. 241, 257-59
(discussing problems the joint return is designed to solve). A 1947 Treasury Department
report entitled The Tax Treatment of Family Income made no recommendations but merely
"examine[d] alternative methods of correcting discriminations which arise in the treatment
of family income under present Federal income-tax law." Treasury Department, The Tax
Treatment of Income, reprinted in 47 U.S. REvEN E Ac=: 1909-1950: THE LAWS, LEGIS-
LATrVE HisTosms & ADMnISTRAT=V DocuMENrs 844-74 (Bernard Reams, Jr. ed.,
1979). Professors Robinson and Wenig state that income splitting was adopted not out of
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pooled all their resources regardless of who earned or owned them.
The second assumption was that sharing of income automatically
meant that control of the income was also shared. Finally, the joint
return, in order to be helpful to married couples, assumed a "tradi-
tional" marriage in which there was only one earner in each family. In
today's world, these assumptions are no longer tenable.'23
Even in 1948 these assumptions were not entirely accurate. If all
income were jointly shared, then why had all states not switched to a
community property system? Carolyn Jones presents evidence that
many states rejected community property laws precisely because they
gave rights to spouses who had not earned the income.124 Neverthe-
less, pooling of income, at least at the lower levels of income, was
generally assumed despite a general absence of empirical evidence to
support it.125 The second assumption concerning equal control, a pre-
ability-to-pay considerations, but out of necessity to stem the flight to community property
law. But they do recognize that the change was "tax reform" to the extent that it reduced
taxes for middle and upper class couples in common-law states. Toni Robinson & Mary
Moers Wenig, Marry in Haste, Repent at Tax Time: Marital Status as a Tax Determinant, 8
VA. TAx REv. 773, 777-79 (1989).
123. See supra Parts I, II.
124. Jones, supra note 94, at 269-70. Some questioned, however, whether community
property laws actually produced joint ownership, since the earning spouse still controlled
the income. Id. (citation omitted). Jones also states that another reason that states resisted
converting to a community property system was the legal, financial, and administrative
difficulties of such a conversion. Id. at 271-73.
125. The need for research has been stressed in Dulude, supra note 48, at 88; Nelson,
supra note 48; Praeger, supra note 47, at 7 n.20. Since Dulude's 1985 article, there have
been increased inquiries into the intra-household allocation of resources. See studies cited
supra Part II.B.
Louise Dulude states that, given how "crucial" the pooling assumption is,
it is remarkable that not a single survey was ever carried out in North America to
verify its accuracy. When American professors McIntyre and Oldman wrote that
"married couples should be assumed to share their income equally" because
"common experience suggests that at least partial pooling of sources to finance
community consumption is almost universal," the best support they could find for
this assumption was a 1965 article based on unsupported statements of various
sociologists in the 1950s and early '60s .... Generalized pooling and sharing is
now a fundamental tenet of the American and British tax systems, but the foun-
dation on which they are built is still a mystery.
Dulude, supra note 48, at 88 (citing McIntyre & Oldman, supra note 93, at 1578, 1594).
McIntyre responded that Dulude's challenge to the sharing assumption failed because
"for purposes of the benefit principle, the question to be decided is whether marital part-
ners share the benefits of income. Control over income, which is what Dulude generally is
commenting upon, should be relevant only in a tax system that makes control over income
the measure of taxable capacity." Michael J. McIntyre, Tax Justice for Family Members
After New York State Tax Reform, 57 ALB. L. REv. 789, 792-93, 797 n.7 (1987). This is an
odd comment, since control is a measure of taxable capacity in our system. See supra note
108 and accompanying text. However, even if the benefit principle should prevail, income
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requisite to taxability under general tax principles, lacked universal-
ity.12 6 The final assumption of one-earner couples also was not
uniformly true: In April 1948, 23.1% of all married women partici-
pated in the labor force.'2 7
These discrepancies are even greater today than they were in
1948.128 First, many more nonlegal families exist. To the extent that
these families are treated differently from married couples, such treat-
ment is inequitable. Furthermore, while the partnership model of
marriage may be more true today from a legal standpoint than it was
in 1948, pooling, which is a concomitant of the partnership model, is
far from universal. Legally, even the community property system still
does not require complete joint management and control.
To the extent laws require joint management and control, they
come closer to justifying income-splitting than did the pre-1948 stat-
utes. But they do not really justify income-splitting because in most
community property states the couple can opt out of the community
property system.129 Thus, by choosing to stay within the community
property system, the earner-spouse, in fact, exercises control over his
should be pooled only if the benefits of that income are in fact shared equally. The assump-
tion of pooling should not go unchallenged, even under a benefits theory.
Using Census Bureau data, David Hernandez, chief of the marriage and family
branch of the Census Bureau, states that even in the 1940s many children were not born
into "traditional" families in which the father worked full-time and the mother stayed
home. Diane Crispell, "Traditional" Families Have Thin Tradition, People Patterns, WALL
ST. J., May 12, 1993, at B1 (reporting that 41% of children born.in the 12 months prior to
the 1949 census and 45% in the 12 months prior to the 1950 census were born into non-
traditional families). Today, he states, only approximately 20% are so born. Id. Even
fewer older children live in such traditional families. Hernandez found that only 26% of
17-year-olds lived in such families in 1940 and only 10% in 1989. Id.
Of course, to the extent that the family pools income, children's income should be
included in the taxable unit. Even if children are allowed to keep their money separate,
their income affects the parents' spending habits and support of the children. See, e.g.,
Bittker, supra note 93, at 1397 (referring to the Canadian Royal Commission's rationale
for taxing families on their consolidated income).
126. See supra Part II.
127. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACr OF THE UNITED STATES,
tbl. 274 (80th ed. 1960). By 1991, that figure had risen to 58.5%. STAT. ABSTRACr, supra
note 12, at tbl. 619.
128. See supra Part I.
129. McCLANAHAN, supra note 29, at 409; see, e.g., LA. Cirv. CODE art. 2329 (permit-
ting couples to opt out of community property without any court action if done prior to
marriage or within the first year of domicile within the state; otherwise, court approval is
necessary).
November 1993] LOVE, MONEY, AND THE IRS
entire earnings, which makes them taxable to him alone.' 30 More-
over, to the extent that statutes still permit a spouse to control prop-
erty by himself, basic tax principles attributing income to the one who
controls it are still being violated. Even if the community property
laws were to create legal ownership rights truly equivalent to com-
mon-law rights, couples themselves frequently would not treat the
property as equally owned.131
Finally, state property rights need not govern tax law. Congress
can easily mandate uniform tax treatment in this area despite state
differences. Congress did just that in 1984 in a related area when it
established uniform tax treatment of alimony and property settle-
ments despite varying state laws. 132 In fact, Congress had already
overridden community property law for certain tax purposes. Section
879(a) of the Internal Revenue Code (dealing with a married couple,
one or both of whom is a non-resident alien) 133 and section 1402(a)(5)
(dealing with self-employment income) attribute all income and de-
ductions to the spouse who earned it, despite community property
laws, unless the wife exercises substantially all of the management and
control.34 In fact, even in two community property states, tax law is
not controlled by community property. 35
Common-law equitable distribution statutes do not justify in-
come-splitting since the rights arise only on dissolution of marriage. 136
While the statutes might put restraints on management during mar-
riage, these restraints are much too limited to impose income-splitting
when the majority of control of the property still rests with the earner.
Moreover, a significant number of couples do not pool their in-
come.137 Even when couples state that they do pool, nominal sharing
frequently does not lead to actual sharing.' 38 Only the real economic
130. Justices Douglas and Black so argued. Commissioner v. Harmon, 323 U.S. 44,51-
57 (1944) (Douglas & Black, JJ., dissenting); see also Bittker, supra note 93, at 1411 (dis-
cussing the Harmon dissent).
131. See supra Part II.
132. Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 421, 98 Stat. 494 (1984)
(amending I.R.C. § 71 and adding I.R.C. § 1041).
133. I.R.C. § 879(a) (West 1993).
134. I.R.C. § 1402(a)(5) (West 1993). If the wife exercises management and control,
then all the income and deductions are attributable to the wife. Id.
135. In Arizona and California, the state tax can tax either the earner on the total
earned income, or the community property owners each on one-half of the income. SEC-
TION ON TAXATION, ABA COMMITTEE ON DOMESTIC RELATIONS PROBLEM, LEGISLATIVE
RECOMMENDATION 13 (Draft, June 21, 1993).
136. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3105.17(A) (Anderson 1992).
137. See supra Part II.
138. Id.
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system matters for tax purposes, not the nominal or formal relation-
ship. Under traditional income tax principles, control typically gov-
erns taxation. The mere receipt of a benefit does not cause a person
to be taxed. For example, when Taxpayer A assigns her salary or rent
from property she owns to Taxpayer B, without consideration given by
B, A is taxed on the salary or rent despite the fact that B has the
beneficial enjoyment. Thus, the mere fact that B enjoys the house,
car, and general lifestyle purchased with the spouse's salary is not a
sufficient basis to tax A and B as if B had received half the income.
B's benefits are tax-free gifts.
Finally, even in those rare instances of true pooling, income-split-
ting of earned income is not justified since the earner has ultimate
control over the money by virtue of his decision to work. A taxpayer
who donates $10,000 of his salary to charity still has to include that
$10,000 in gross income, although he may get a charitable deduc-
tion.139 Similarly, a taxpayer who pools $10,000 of his salary should
include that amount in income, although a dependency deduction
could be allowed for all or part of that amount.
Conclusion
As long-term living arrangements have grown increasingly varied
and complex, financial arrangements also have been shaped by cul-
tural, sociological, psychological, and economic factors. Because of
the complexity and the prevailing myth of marital pooling, survey data
is likely to be biased in favor of pooling: Respondents are more likely
to overstate, not understate, the extent of sharing. Nevertheless, my
study and the others discussed in this Article clearly establish several
facts: (1) not all couples pool assets; (2) pooling is not confined to
married couples, and separation of assets is not confined to nonmar-
ried couples; (3) financial arrangements sometimes change during the
course of the relationship; and (4) even among those couples who say
they pool, in reality the nonearner spouse often does not have equal
access to assets; instead the earner controls the money. In short, the
empirical evidence on pooling refutes the basic assumption underlying
the joint return. The evidence highlights the unfairness of the current
joint filing system, which is both under-inclusive (barring some un-
married poolers from its benefits) and over-inclusive (bestowing its
benefits on nonpooling married couples).
139. See I.R.C. § 170(a) (West 1993).
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The number of couples who keep some or all of their income sep-
arate is substantial. In fact, in Hertz's study the majority of couples
kept finances separately. Even if seventy percent of couples state they
pool all income (the random survey), that means thirty percent do not.
Thirty percent is not insignificant. In fact, given the morally and psy-
chologically charged nature of the issue, the number of people who in
reality do not pool everything is undoubtedly understated. Peoples'
statements about sharing household income are similar to their state-
ments about the related question of whether couples share household
chores. As Arlie Hochschild found, "more people wanted to share
and imagined that they did" than actually did.140 Because the domi-
nant cultural myth regarding income is that people share their income,
people state that they share or believe in sharing even when they do
not. The lack of sharing may be subtle, discernable for example only
through a pattern of deference by the wife to the husband's deci-
sions.141 Surely, when sixty-six percent of married women say "it's
ethical to hide a portion of their spending money in a secret stash,"'
1 42
the freedom that nonearner women feel to spend "shared" income
must be called into question.
Despite the inaccuracies of pooling, some people advocate the
joint return as a means to promote the "family" and "family val-
ues."'1 43 In reality, the joint return is disadvantageous for many fami-
140. ARLIE HOCHSCHILD, THE SECOND SHIFT 20 (1989).
141. Hochschild cites a revealing instance in regard to household chore sharing in
which the couple stated they shared all the housework. Yet the father, who was holding
the baby, asked the mother what time she wanted him to put the child to bed. He thus
indicated that in reality the wife was in charge of child care. Id.
142. Honesty Not Best Marital Policy?, supra note 53 (citing a McCall's magazine
survey).
143. The National Commission on America's Urban Families, for instance, issued its
report in early 1993. It stated: "The optimal family form for childrearing, and for long-
term personal and societal well-being, is the intact, two-parent family anchored by mar-
riage, in which both father and mother love and provide for their children." NATIONAL
COMMISSION ON AMERICA'S URBAN FAMILIES, FAMILIES FIRST: REPORT OF THE NA-
TIONAL COMMISSION ON AMERICA'S URBAN FAMILIES 29 (1993). It recommended that
policies, programs, individuals, and organizations "should empower the family, strengthen
marriage, build support for families, and give families priority." Id. at 40. One method of
empowering families, it suggested, was to "establish greater tax fairness for families" by,
among other things, "[e]nhanc[ing] the favorable treatment for married couples in the tax
code by increasing the differential between single earners and married couples and/or by
enhancing opportunities for married couples to split their incomes." Id. at 41.
The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 raised the marriage penalty by in-
creasing the marginal rates while elevating the penalty for many two-earner couples, but
many "traditional" families (i.e., families with one earner) would continue to receive a
"bonus." Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat. 312, 13201-13202. Accounting professionals main-
tain that the wealthy are the chief beneficiaries of the marriage bonus, since most wealthy
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lies, such as those in which both partners of a married couple work.
The joint return also fails to help alternative families in which there is
no married couple. Alternative groups, which are a rapidly increasing
percentage of the population, serve traditional family functions: They
are cohesive groups whose members show great personal commitment
to each other and provide multivaried support to each other.144 In a
society that traces many of its ills to social disintegration and aliena-
tion, is it wise to disadvantage any group that counteracts these
trends? A rational family policy should support any type of group
that promotes commitment, support, and sustenance.
Thus, assuming that one goal of the tax system is to assist families
and assuming that joint returns help families, one way to promote
families and eliminate the present inequities between similarly situ-
ated groups would be to extend the joint filing system to all "families."
As we have seen, the functional approach to families is indefinite and
open to abuse: How would the IRS determine whether a group met
this definition? Should the IRS even be involved in such an inquiry?
Moreover, to make any sense from a tax standpoint, the joint re-
turn, if it is justifiable at all, is only justified for those families who in
fact pool income. This Article has shown that not all couples pool
their incomes. Consequently, only those groups, married or unmar-
ried, who actually pool should be allowed to file a joint return.
Such a regime, however, would violate another tax principle-
simplicity.145 Because pooling is so fact-specific, proof of pooling
would be very intrusive. Further complications would arise because
whether a couple pooled could change from year to year. Moreover,
true pooling would be difficult, if not impossible, to discern due to the
many psychological and sociological factors implicated in the issue.
men are married to nonworking spouses. Ellen E. Schultz, Living in Sin to Cut Tax Bill
Would Look Even Better to Some Under Clinton Plan, WALL ST. J., Mar. 9, 1993, at Cl; see
also supra note 98 and accompanying text.
Families can switch from having a marriage penalty to a marriage bonus, or vice versa,
as their circumstances change. For example, in 1992 the First Family-Bill and Hillary
Rodham Clinton-paid a marriage penalty as a two-earner couple. In 1993 they will re-
ceive a marriage bonus because Bill is the only earner. Schultz, supra. The Clintons' situa-
tion illustrates how difficult it is to craft a tax provision that favors families unless it defines
families so narrowly that it excludes many Americans (two-earner couples).
144. See supra Part II.
145. Jort CoMMrrrEE ON TAXATION, ANALYSIS OF PROPOSALs RELATING TO COM-
rPREHNsrvE TAX REFORM, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1985); Joseph T. Sneed, The Criteria of
Federal Income Tax Policy, 17 STAN. L. REv. 567, 568 (1965). Simplification can have
many meanings, such as more easily understood statutes, more easily understood forms,
and easier and more efficient administration. Charles E. McClure, Budget Process and Tax
Simplification/Complication, 45 TAx L. REv. 25, 42 (1990).
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Detailed inquiry into financial arrangements and interpersonal dy-
namics by the IRS would be expensive and invasive, but not conclu-
sive, and would inevitably result in a great deal of litigation.
Even if the tax system could overcome these problems, a joint
return system would not aid all families. The "family" rhetoric often
used in connection with the joint return hides the reality that the joint
return is disadvantageous for many families. The joint return places
an extra burden on the increasing number of two-earner families. It
also discourages some women from working outside the home who
might otherwise do so for economic and social reasons. As for the
"typical" one-earner family that the joint return was designed to bene-
fit, the joint return places the burden of tax liability on the nonearner
by making her jointly liable for the tax, but ignores the reality of eco-
nomic dominance of the earner. The joint return ignores the issues
raised by the empirical studies. Many men and women do not want to
pool all their income; indeed, the relationship between the couple will
be more stable if each partner retains some independence. This evi-
dence suggests that in some situations the joint return not only does
not promote traditional family functions, but may in fact be detrimen-
tal to them.
The joint return ought to be abolished. A system that treats each
person as a separate taxable unit is more equitable, more consistent
with basic tax principles, more efficient, and ultimately better able to
accomplish social family goals.
146
146. Exact details of such a system can be found in INCOME TAX TREATMENT, supra
note 17, at 38-68. This system arguably has some potential complications. For example,
although wage earnings cannot easily be manipulated, investment earnings can. The high-
earning partner, for example, can transfer investment assets to the lower-bracket partner.
This problem, however, is not insurmountable. First, such transfers would not always oc-
cur, even if they are advantageous from a tax standpoint, because such a transfer has in-
dependent significance. Title does matter and many partners are unwilling to give it up.
Second, some kind of joint return only for investment income could be developed. Each
partner could perhaps be permitted a set amount of independent investment income. This
amount could be a percentage of earned income. Investment income in excess of this
amount would be combined and taxed either at a separate rate or the higher rate of the
two partners. Such a limited joint return is less objectionable than one for all income.
Investment income could be controlled by either partner, whereas control of earned in-
come would always ultimately rest with the earner. If the earner does not work, the money
would not be earned. Furthermore, the ease of manipulation of investments makes a joint
return for such income a justifiable administrative compromise, whereas no such adminis-
trative complexities mar the determination of who earned wage income. See, e.g., I.R.C.
§ 879 (West 1993) (dealing with the tax treatment of community income of non-resident
aliens).
Julie Nelson proposes that the appropriate tax unit is neither the individual, nor the
family, but the "person in relation," that is
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Separate taxation is more equitable because it treats similar tax-
payers similarly. Our system is an income tax; by taxing each individ-
ual on her income, the system does not unfairly discriminate based on
certain taxpayers' living arrangements. If we wish to use the tax sys-
tem to assist people who have taken on dependents, then Congress
can enact tax provisions giving deductions or credits for dependents,
be they adults or children.
Separate taxation also is consistent with our tax system's basic
principle that the person who controls the income should be taxed on
it even if another benefits. The control principle is particularly apt for
earned income since only the earner can produce that income. As the
empirical studies show, the earner usually controls the income even if
the couple states that they pool.
Separate taxation also would be more efficient than joint taxa-
tion. For example, the joint return discourages the second earner
from working by placing her in a higher marginal bracket. Studies
show that the wages of the second earner, usually the wife, are sensi-
tive to the tax rate, whereas the wages of married men and singles are
relatively insensitive.147 Joint returns thus discourage wives from
an individual earner plus his or her dependants [sic]. By "dependants" I mean
those persons who, unable to support themselves for reasons such as youth, ad-
vanced old age, or chronic disability, rely on the earner for their economic sup-
port. Able-bodied adults are never engulfed in this definition: even if they are
non-earners, their productive capacity is recognized and they are never consid-
ered as dependants.
Nelson, supra note 48, at 23. Her system is a marriage-neutral system that respects the
integrity of the individual. A nonearning adult "neither files nor provides anyone with an
exemption." Id. at 24. Each earning adult files a return. Presumably only one of them will
be able to claim a personal exemption amount for their children or other dependents.
Laura Ann Davis argues for a separate return system for all individuals under which
community property laws would be ignored for tax purposes. An individual would be
taxed on all her earned income and on her proportionate share of jointly owned property.
Income from community property would be treated like that from joint bank accounts-
allocated according to relative contributions. Davis, supra note 94, at 238.
147. The Joint Committee on Taxation indicated:
Considerations of economic efficiency dictate that tax rates be lowest on persons
whose work effort would be most responsive to lower taxes. Virtually all statisti-
cal studies of the issue conclude that a wife's work effort is more responsive to
reduced taxes than her husband's .... However, the present system may have
countervailing benefits to the extent society gains from uncompensated work per-
formed by wives.
INCoME TAX TREATmENT, supra note 17, at 5. Statistical studies since 1980 continue to
demonstrate that the wife's earnings are more tax sensitive. McCaffery, supra note 94, at
1039 n.211. As to the countervailing benefits from uncompensated work done by wives,
there is an inefficient allocation of resources if different types of income (imputed v.
earned) are treated differently for tax purposes.
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working by placing them in higher marginal brackets than they would
be in as individuals. Thus, it is more economically efficient to treat
individuals as separate taxable units so as not to discourage women
from working.
Separate taxation would also further certain "family values" bet-
ter than joint taxation. For example, there has been much debate
about the plight of children in general and the rising number of poor
children; proposals have been made to enact child tax credits to bene-
fit children.148 However, there is no "guarantee," as Judith Younger
has stated, that "a family receiving the credit would spend its extra
dollars on its children."'1 49 Arguably, there is a better chance that the
money would be spent for the children if the woman gets the credit.
Studies show that women are more likely than men to allocate more
of their earnings to children.' 50 Separate taxation can strengthen the
family unit by permitting the second partner to work without suffering
a tax penalty whenever economic or psychological factors encourage
or dictate a two-earner family. Separate taxation may also strengthen
families by reinforcing a sense of independence and self-worth in both
partners. Such feelings form the basis of modern, healthy relation-
ships which are built not on paternalism, but on true equality. If mar-
riages are partnerships they are or should be partnerships between
equal members.
The individual tax unit is superior to the joint tax return in many
respects: It is fairer, simpler, more in accord with principles of taxa-
tion, more economically efficient, and better equipped to accomplish
certain social goals. Empirical studies show that not all couples share
their income. Even if all poolers could be correctly identified, joint
returns are a poor policy choice. Since the income tax is a tax based
on an individual's ability to pay, the tax unit logically should be the
individual. Pooling is a normative issue with complicated social and
psychodynamic implications. A joint return that applied only to fami-
lies that pooled would add complications to an already overly compli-
148. E.g., H.R. 2242, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (Working Family Relief Act intro-
duced by Rep. Thomas J. Downey (D-N.Y.) with 56 Democratic cosponsors, which pro-
vided for a refundable credit instead of the current deduction); H.R. 2434, 103d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1993) (Putting Jobs and the American Family First Act of 1993 introduced by Rep.
Rodney Grams (R-Minn.) with 64 Republican cosponsors, which provides for a $500 tax
credit per child; this bill was still pending as of October 22, 1993, and still adding cospon-
sors); see also NATIONAL COMMISSION OF CHILDREN, FINAL REPORT, BEYOND RHETORIC:
A NEW AGENDA FOR CHILDREN AND FAMILIES 94-95 (1991), cited in Younger, supra note
43, at 898 (recommending a $1000-per-child refundable credit).
149. Younger, supra note 43, at 898.
150. See, e.g., Rogers, supra note 49, at 8.
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cated code, without furthering any goals of the tax system. On the
other hand, the joint return as it exists now does not further family
values since it does not help all families.
The individual return is not the perfect solution to the taxable
unit issue because no perfect solution can exist when it must inevitably
rest on social and political values. Nevertheless, because the individ-
ual return is a better solution than the joint return, the joint return
ought to be abolished.

